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INTRODUCTION
Imagine another terrorist strike on United States soil similar
to the events of September 11, 2001. Within days, Congress considers
amending federal law to specify that under defined conditions in the
wake of a terrorist attack, the United States military would have
exclusive authority to maintain law and order within the affected
area.1 Members of Congress, however, take pause at the Supreme
Court’s previous admonitions that criminal law enforcement is a
traditional subject of state concern in our federal system. They
therefore decide not to replace state and local law enforcement
personnel with the military. Instead, they put state and local officers
under federal command (with federal pay) for the duration of the
emergency conditions.
Under the Rehnquist Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,
Congress would not have this option; the authorizing legislation would
clearly fall within the Court’s categorical ban on “commandeering”
state and local officials. “Commandeering” refers to a federal
requirement that state officials enact, administer, or enforce a federal
regulatory program. Under the same Tenth Amendment decisions,
however, there would be no constitutional impediment were Congress
to authorize the military to maintain law and order within the
targeted area until the emergency had passed. The Court has
circumscribed Congress’s freedom of action in the name of federalism.
Yet the impermissible, commandeering option potentially leaves room
for a state role in maintaining law and order, while the permissible,
preemptive alternative does not allow states to exercise regulatory
control.2 The primary purpose of this Article is first to suggest that
this legal regime makes scant sense from a federalism perspective,
and then to offer a better alternative in its place.
The Tenth Amendment experienced something of a federalism
revival during the 1990s,3 when the Rehnquist Court breathed new
1.
See infra Part V for a more detailed exploration of this hypothetical.
2.
This Article uses the term “preemption” in the sense of direct federal regulation, not
necessarily in the sense of a complete federal ouster of state regulatory authority. Preemption
does not always remove states from the regulatory scene, at least not entirely, because federal
law may set a regulatory floor or ceiling instead of a specific requirement, and states may
exercise their authority consistently with the federal mandate.
3.
Other doctrinal areas–specifically, the Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment,
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment–experienced similar federalism revivals. See
infra notes 30, 164-65 (citing the relevant case law). Noticeably absent from this list is the
Spending Clause. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s Power Under the Commerce
Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 765 (2003) (“It seems plain
that truly imposing substantive limits on Congress’s regulatory reach, which the rhetoric of
Lopez and Morrison describe, and thereby carving out areas of state sovereignty, rather than
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life into the amendment’s seemingly truistic language.4 First, in New
York v. United States, the Court held that Congress could not order
state legislatures either to regulate low-level radioactive waste in
accordance with federal instructions or to take title to the waste.5
Then, in Printz v. United States, the Court decided that Congress
could not order state executive officials to help conduct background
checks on would-be handgun purchasers on an interim basis.6 In both
cases, the Court supported its conclusion by stressing the importance
of political accountability. In New York, for example, Justice O’Connor
wrote for the Court that
where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both
state and federal officials is diminished. If the citizens of New York, for example, do not
consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best
interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That view can always be
pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the national view, but in
such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the
public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns
out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government directs the
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated
from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with
the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.7

Five years later, Justice Scalia stressed “sovereignty” in addition to
accountability, insisting on behalf of the Court in Printz that “[i]t is
simply directing Congress to work its will in one way or another, will require the Court to
address the Spending Clause.”); Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (using doctrinal analysis and game theory to examine the scope
of the conditional spending power going forward); see also infra note 51 (discussing South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)); infra Part II.D (analyzing conditional spending from a federalism
perspective).
4.
The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.” The text of the amendment makes explicit what is implicit in both the enumeration
of powers allocated to Congress in Article I, Section 8 and the bedrock distinction between a
national government of limited powers and state governments of plenary powers. See, e.g., New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (“The Tenth Amendment . . . restrains the
power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself,
which . . . is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of
the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the
States.”); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (“The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”).
5.
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the “take title” provision of the Low Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 constitutes unconstitutional compulsion and
commandeering of the governmental capacity of state governments).
6.
521 U. S. 898 (1997) (relying on a Tenth Amendment anticommandeering rationale in
holding unconstitutional certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act).
7.
505 U.S. at 168-69.
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the very principle of separate state sovereignty that [commandeering]
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome that fundamental defect.”8 Anticommandeering doctrine
thus prohibits the federal government from requiring the states to
enact, to administer, or to enforce a federal regulatory program under
any circumstances.
Commentators have exposed vulnerabilities in the Court’s
anticommandeering logic. In light of the silence of the Constitution on
commandeering,9 the absence of strong support for New York and
Printz in originalist sources,10 and the only modest backing for these
decisions throughout American history and in the U.S. Reports,11 it is
not clear that political accountability is a Tenth Amendment value, let
alone one that the Court is charged with vindicating broadly and
aggressively through a categorical rule.12 Nor is it clear that
commandeering inevitably generates serious accountability concerns
regardless of what Congress, the states, the news media, or citizens
may do to address potential problems. Even after factoring in search
costs and rational ignorance, it seems likely that citizens who pay
attention to public affairs and who care to inquire will be able to
discern which level of government is responsible for a government
regulation, and citizens who do not care to inquire may be largely
beyond judicial or political help on the accountability front. They may
not be part of “the public” in whose “full view” the federal government
preempts state law.13 Government officials also have an abiding
8.
521 U.S. at 932.
9.
The text of the Tenth Amendment says nothing of commandeering. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. By contrast, Article I, Section 8 speaks explicitly to the broad scope of
Congress’s power.
10. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“In deciding these cases, which
I have found closer than I had anticipated, it is The Federalist that finally determines my
position. I believe that the most straightforward reading of No. 27 is authority for the
Government’s position here, and that this reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent
with Nos. 36 and 45.”).
11. In Printz, Justice Scalia conceded for the Court that “[t]he constitutional practice we
have examined above tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but
is not conclusive.” Id. at 918. As for precedent, which Justice Scalia turned to “most conclusively
in the present litigation,” id. at 925, the Court focused most of its attention on New York. Id. at
925-31.
12. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201, 2204 (1998) (Commandeering “can risk confusing the lines of
political accountability—but the extent to which this is likely (or more likely than in other forms
of federal-state action) depends on the substance and substantiality of the burden. Political
accountability may be relevant but does not of itself justify the broad rule adopted by the
Court.”); id. at 2257 (“Although bright-line rules may offer comparative advantages in reducing
risks of error or bias by other decisionmakers (here, lower courts), they do so only at the
inevitable cost of being overinclusive or underinclusive in serving their substantive purposes.”).
13. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
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interest in informing voters when they are responsible for popular
actions. And when these actions prove unpopular, such that politicians
have an incentive to engage in blame shifting, the popular press often
serves to advance political accountability. Finally, federal preemption
and conditional spending also trigger accountability concerns.14 So
does giving states the choice between commandeering and
preemption.15
Even if one believes that commandeering triggers political
accountability concerns appropriate for judicial vindication, the
question arises whether accountability exhausts the relevant
constitutional considerations, or whether other federalism values are
pertinent to the proper scope of anticommandeering doctrine. This
inquiry argues that the constitutional calculus is considerably more
complicated than the Court’s opinions suggest. The following analysis
captures the factors in play by articulating a simple expected-value
equation and unpacking its components. The analysis uses this
equation to trace out the consequences of anticommandeering
doctrine—both widely recognized and potentially counterintuitive—for
the Constitution’s commitment to federalism.
This investigation shows that several distinct concerns are at
stake—values central to the project of federalism—and further
14. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering,
in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 231 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) (“[T]he danger of
blurring lines of accountability in the case of commandeering is not categorically different from
what happens in the case of federal pre-emption, which the Court accepts. In both cases, the
component State’s actions or inactions are only partially determined by State politicians, yet
citizens are likely to view the component State officials as fully responsible whenever the latter
are the most salient agents involved. In both cases proper lines of accountability can be
preserved when component States are vigilant in publicizing the respective roles of the federal
and State policy-makers on any given issue. Given proper information, citizens should find the
lines of accountability reasonably clear.”); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1001, 1054-55 (1995) (“Commandeering precludes state officials from being directly and
exclusively responsive to their constituency’s desires, but so does conventional preemption.
Although one can use verbal wordplay to make it sound as though commandeering and
preemption frustrate accountability in different ways, this is merely definitional manipulation
without substance. Prohibiting commandeering but not preemption in the name of securing the
accountability of state government is simply arbitrary.”) (footnote omitted); Jackson, supra note
12, at 2202 (“Standard preemption—the effect of federal law in negating the area in which state
law can operate—can obscure the causes of inaction by state officials. Conditional spending
regulatory requirements, though nominally involving a state’s choice to accept federal funds, can
result in a very confusing picture of responsibility to voters. Why, then, would commandeering be
different?” (footnote omitted)). See also infra Parts II.D, IV.E (discussing accountability concerns
in various regulatory contexts).
15. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 386 n.51 (2005) (“It is possible that this attenuation of political
accountability is one reason cooperative federalism is popular.”).
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demonstrates that anticommandeering doctrine causes net harm to
federalism values under certain circumstances.16 Specifically, New
York and Printz vindicate federalism values to some extent by
addressing any accountability problems caused by commandeering
and by requiring the federal government to internalize more of the
costs of federal regulation before engaging in regulation. At the same
time, however, anticommandeering doctrine undermines federalism
values when the (clearly constitutional) alternative of preemption is
reasonably available and the commandeering ban thus places states in
danger of losing regulatory control in a greater number of future
instances.17 This consequence of the doctrine is problematic from a
federalism perspective because direct federal regulation limits state
regulatory power to a greater extent than does commandeering as a
general matter, and states must retain regulatory control in order to
realize the values typically associated with federalism.18
This investigation demonstrates that anticommandeering
doctrine is seriously over- and under-inclusive, whether considered in
light of federalism values as a whole or in light of the accountability
concerns on which the Court has inappropriately fixated. This
disconnect between legal doctrine and animating values suggests that
the Rehnquist Court’s Tenth Amendment legacy has more to do with a
symbolic and judicially manageable gesture in the direction of “states’
rights” than with the substance of federalism as constitutional law
intended to safeguard state autonomy. For a federalism concerned
with state retention of regulatory control, the relevant questions
sound in a distinctly constitutional form of cost-benefit analysis.19 The
16. For a discussion of the values that federalism is thought to advance and their
dependence upon meaningful levels of state regulatory control, see infra notes 87-95 and
accompanying text.
17. Preemption is the constitutional principle derived from the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, providing that if a conflict exists between valid federal law and state or local
laws, federal law controls and the state or local laws are invalidated on the ground that federal
law is supreme. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)
(“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any state law,
however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to
federal law, must yield.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (concluding that federal law trumps state laws that “interfere with, or are
contrary to the laws of Congress” because “[i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is
supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted,
must yield to it”). In New York, Justice O’Connor stated that preemption, unlike commandeering,
does not trigger Tenth Amendment concerns. See supra text accompanying note 7.
18. This consequence is also problematic because preemption raises accountability concerns
of its own. See supra note 14.
19. While cost-benefit analysis is arguably external to constitutional law (though balancing
tests are similar), here the values determining the range of cognizable costs and benefits are
internal to constitutional doctrine in the sense that the Court’s federalism opinions have
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decisive issues are (1) whether the proffered accountability benefits
generated by current Tenth Amendment doctrine are cost-justified by
exceeding the expected damage to state regulatory control (and
political accountability) caused by preemption, and (2) whether the
relative financial and temporal costs to the states of commandeering,
as opposed to preemption, tip the balance one way or the other.
The upshot of this analysis is that instances of commandeering
should carry a presumption of unconstitutionality when preemption is
not a feasible alternative in the short run, the federal mandate is
unfunded and expensive, and the federal government makes little
effective effort to alleviate reasonable accountability concerns. Only a
substantial governmental interest should suffice to overcome this
presumption. By contrast, commandeering should be held
constitutional as far as the Tenth Amendment is concerned when
preemption constitutes a feasible alternative in the short run and such
preemption would reduce state regulatory control relative to the
commandeering at issue, the federal mandate is fully funded or
relatively inexpensive to carry out, and the federal government takes
effective measures to maintain lines of accountability (or
accountability is for some other reason not seriously threatened).
Thus, this approach to commandeering turns the conventional
wisdom about New York and Printz on its head. According to the
standard accountability story, the “hard” commandeering of the state
legislative process at issue in New York was more invasive and thus
more problematic than the relatively “soft,” interim commandeering of
state and local executive officials implicated in Printz.20 Incorporating
concerns about regulatory control into the analysis, however, changes
the calculus significantly. Because federal preemption was reasonably
available (and indeed had already been threatened21) in New York but
not in Printz, and because New York did not in fact involve more
serious accountability concerns, this inquiry submits that Printz
remains the closer case and New York the easier one—but that New
York was easier in the opposite direction. Instead of an “easy kill,” the
federal law at issue in New York should have been upheld against the
state’s Tenth Amendment challenge.
Part I briefly surveys the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment
cases, focusing on the decisions between 1990 and the present. Part II
conducts a theoretical analysis of anticommandeering doctrine from a
federalism perspective, and Part III applies this analysis to New York
identified these values as relevant to the practice of constitutional adjudication. See infra Part
IV.A.
20. See infra Part III for a discussion of this issue.
21. See id.
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and Printz. Part IV anticipates various potential objections to the
argument, and Part V employs a war-on-terror hypothetical to
illustrate the argument’s potential force. The Conclusion defends
substantive standards and balancing and rejects categorical rules
sounding mostly in symbolism as the proper approach to federalism
questions in constitutional law.
I.

A SHORT SURVEY OF TENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

Throughout American history, one of two conceptions of the
Tenth Amendment has prevailed at a given time. During the 1800s,
the Supreme Court viewed the amendment not as an independent
limit on legislative authority that Congress might violate, but rather
as a reminder that the federal government is one of limited powers,
such that Congress may legislate in a certain area only if the
Constitution grants it authority to do so.22
During the early 1900s and up until 1937, the Court embraced
the very different understanding that the Tenth Amendment
safeguards state autonomy from federal overreaching. According to
this view, the amendment reserves a zone of exclusive regulatory
authority to the states, and courts must hold unconstitutional federal
laws that disregard this exclusive reservation of power. Specifically,
the pre-1937 Court concluded that the Tenth Amendment left to the
states sole control over the production of goods, so that federal laws
aimed at regulating production were invalid.23
From 1937 until the early 1990s, the Court reverted to its
nineteenth-century view of the Tenth Amendment.24 During this
period, the Court found only one Tenth Amendment violation. That
decision—National League of Cities v. Usery25—was overruled less

22. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97 (“[If], as has always been understood, the
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the
power over commerce . . . among the several states . . . is vested in Congress as absolutely as it
would be in a single government.”).
23. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1918)
(invalidating a federal law prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced in
factories employing child labor because “[t]he grant of power to Congress over the subject of
interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to
control the States in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture”).
24. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart
in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), which
prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made by employees whose wages or
hours contravened the Act’s protections, in part because the Tenth “Amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered”). See also supra note 4 (quoting the
Court’s opinion in Darby).
25. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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than a decade later after being distinguished into oblivion. In National
League of Cities, the Court held 5-4 that applying the minimum-wage
provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to state
and local employees violated the Tenth Amendment because the
statute “operate[d] to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”26
The Court did not explain how to identify a “traditional governmental
functio[n],” and it unpersuasively distinguished National League of
Cities in a series of subsequent decisions.27 The Court finally overruled
National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,28 holding that the FLSA could constitutionally be
applied to state and local governments. Writing for himself and the
four National League of Cities dissenters, Justice Blackmun
“reject[ed], as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule
of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial
appraisal of whether a particular government function is ‘traditional’
or ‘integral.’”29
The Rehnquist Court’s reinvigoration of the Tenth Amendment
began in 1991 in a case raising a question of statutory interpretation,
not constitutional law. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,30 Missouri state-court
judges challenged, as violative of the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”),31 the mandatory retirement age set forth
in the state constitution.32 In so doing, the Supreme Court issued a
“clear statement” rule of statutory interpretation: Justice O’Connor
wrote for the majority that the Court will construe federal law to
apply to important state government activities only if Congress issues
26. Id. at 852. Justice Blackmun cast the decisive vote. He wrote ambiguously and
ominously that the majority had adopted “a balancing approach [that] . . . does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would
be essential.” Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
27. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment
challenge to the application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to the states); Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment
challenge to the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, which required state utility
commissions to consider FERC proposals). In each decision, the majority was composed of Justice
Blackmun and the four National League of Cities dissenters.
28. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
29. Id. at 546-47. Because Garcia remains good law, states have a legal duty to comply with
the FLSA. But the Rehnquist Court severely limited Garcia’s impact by holding that state
sovereign immunity prohibits most private suits for money damages to remedy even willful state
violations of concededly valid federal law in federal or state courts. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999); infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (citing the relevant case law).
30. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
32. 501 U.S. at 456.
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a clear statement that it wants the law to apply to the states in these
circumstances.33 Because the ADEA lacked such a clear statement, the
Court concluded that the law did not preempt the state’s mandatory
retirement age.34 In so holding, the Court underscored the role of the
states in preventing tyranny and the importance of the Tenth
Amendment in protecting state regulatory autonomy.35
A year later, the Court issued an arguably novel constitutional
holding in a Tenth Amendment case.36 At issue in New York v. United
States37 was the validity of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985,38 which required states to arrange for
the safe disposal of radioactive waste produced within their borders.
The statute gave states monetary and access incentives to comply with
its requirements, permitting states to impose a surcharge on waste
coming from other states and eventually to deny access to disposal
sites.39 The most controversial part of the law, included to secure
adequate state regulatory action,40 mandated that states would “take
title” to any radioactive waste within their borders that was not
appropriately disposed of by a certain date and would then “be liable
for all damages directly or indirectly incurred.”41
The Court affirmed Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the disposal of radioactive waste.42 The Court also
upheld the act’s financial incentives as within Congress’s power under
33. Id. at 461.
34. Id. at 467.
35. Id. at 458 (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front.”); id. at 461 (“This plain statement rule is nothing more
than an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our
constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”); id. at 463
(“[T]he authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their most
important government officials . . . is an authority that lies at the heart of representative
government. It is a power reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment . . . .” (internal
quotations omitted)).
36. One could argue that the 1990s anticommandeering decisions were not entirely novel.
National League of Cities could be viewed as an indirect form of anticommandeering, preventing
Congress from forcing states to increase taxes or to reduce services in order to comply with the
FLSA’s minimum-wage provisions. Moreover, the Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association cited lower court opinions, see infra note 183, in writing that “there can
be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
37. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b to 2296b-7 (2006).
39. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1992).
40. See infra Part III for a discussion of the rationale behind the commandeering provision.
41. New York, 505 U.S. at 153.
42. Id. at 159-60.
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the Commerce and Spending Clauses,43 and sustained the law’s access
incentives as a conditional exercise of Congress’s commerce power.
Congress, in other words, was constitutionally giving states the choice
between “regulat[ing] the disposal of radioactive waste according to
federal standards by attaining local or regional self-sufficiency” and
having “their residents who produce radioactive waste . . . be subject
to federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny
access to their disposal sites.”44
The Court, however, held the “take title” provision
unconstitutional. Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice O’Connor
stated that this provision forced states to choose between “accepting
ownership of waste” and “regulating according to the instructions of
Congress.”45 Neither imposition was permissible, she concluded,
because requiring states to accept ownership would unconstitutionally
“commandeer” state governments, and mandating compliance with
federal regulatory acts would unlawfully force states to implement
federal statutes.46 Justice O’Connor declared that “[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.”47
As noted above,48 the Court’s constitutional concerns in New
York v. United States centered on the issue of political accountability.
In the Court’s view, Congress was requiring the states to regulate, yet
the states (not the federal government) might be held politically
accountable for the regulatory activity. The Court reasoned that
citizens affected by the regulations would see who was doing the
regulating, not who had made the decision to order regulation in the
first place.49
Despite holding that Congress may not force state legislatures
to pass laws or require state administrative agencies to promulgate
regulations, the New York Court stressed that Congress was hardly
impotent. The Court stated that Congress could bypass state
regulatory regimes entirely by establishing federal standards that all
actors, public and private, must meet. Congress, in other words, could

43. Id. at 171-73.
44. Id. at 174. See infra Part IV.D for an analysis of federal laws that give states the choice
between commandeering and preemption.
45. New York, 505 U.S. at 175. It is noteworthy that Justice Souter joined the majority in
New York and dissented in Printz.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 188.
48. See supra text accompanying note 7.
49. Id. See infra Part III for an argument that the Court’s concerns were misplaced on the
facts of New York.
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preempt state and local regulatory activity.50 Moreover, the Court
affirmed that Congress could condition federal funding of state and
local government activities on their compliance with related
regulatory requirements that Congress could not impose directly:
This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a State to regulate in a
particular way, or that Congress may not hold out incentives to the States as a method
of influencing a State’s policy choices. Our cases have identified a variety of methods,
short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative
program consistent with federal interests. . . . [U]nder Congress’ spending power,
“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”51

Accordingly, Congress could induce states to clean up radioactive
waste by placing conditions on federal grants, even though Congress
could not force states to clean up the waste. Finally, the Court
declared that the Constitution allows Congress to give states the
choice between being commandeered and being preempted.52
The Justices fought their next Tenth Amendment battle five
years later. In Printz v. United States,53 the question presented was
whether the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act54
contravened the Tenth Amendment by requiring state and local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on would-be
handgun buyers on an interim basis until a federal computer database
was created.55 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia
declared the law unconstitutional. He stressed, among other things,56
that Congress was unlawfully commandeering state executive officers
to enforce federal law. In the early years of the Republic and
50. See supra text accompanying note 7; see also supra note 17.
51. New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court held 7-2 that Congress may condition five percent of
federal highway funds on a recipient state’s adopting a 21-year-old drinking age, even assuming
(but not deciding) that the Twenty-First Amendment would prohibit Congress from imposing a
national minimum drinking age directly. 483 U.S. at 217-18. Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed for
the Court that the condition was “clearly stated,” was “directly related to one of the main
purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel,” and was not “so
coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.” Id. at 208, 211.
52. New York, 505 U.S. at 174; see also infra note 172 (quoting this portion of the Court’s
opinion in New York). For an analysis of this option, see infra Part IV.D. See infra Part III for a
discussion of Justice White’s dissent in New York.
53. See supra notes 6, 8.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
55. See infra note 190 for a discussion of the federal database, which is now operating.
56. The Court also concluded that the Act violated the separation of powers because
Congress had taken some of the executive power that Article II vests exclusively in the President
and given it to state and local law enforcement officers. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 989,
922 (1997). For a critical discussion of “unitary executive theory” in the commandeering context
published just before Printz came down, see Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State
Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075 (1997) (citing and analyzing the
relevant literature).
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throughout American history, Justice Scalia wrote, Congress had not
engaged in such commandeering. The Court reaffirmed New York and
concluded that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from
conscripting state governments.57
The Rehnquist Court decided just one other Tenth Amendment
case. In Reno v. Condon,58 the Justices rejected a Tenth Amendment
challenge to a federal statute. At issue was the federal Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), which prohibited states from
disclosing personal information gained by departments of motor
vehicles (“DMVs”), including home addresses, phone numbers, and
social security numbers.59 The Court unanimously reversed the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which had held that the DPPA unconstitutionally commanded states
not to disclose the information.60 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist distinguished New York and Printz. He reasoned that in
Condon Congress was not regulating private actors indirectly by
commandeering the regulatory apparatus of the states; rather,
Congress was regulating directly all entities that possess the driver’s
license information–states and private entities alike.61 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the DPPA did not trigger accountability
concerns.
The Court has not issued a Tenth Amendment holding since
2000. Federal courts of appeals have invalidated only two other
federal laws on Tenth Amendment grounds in recent years.62

57. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923. In a dissent joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
Justice Stevens underscored the need for the Brady Act and rejected the animating principle of
Printz: “When Congress exercises the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it may impose
affirmative obligations on executive and judicial officers of state and local governments as well as
ordinary citizens.” Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006).
60. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
61. Condon, 528 U.S. at 146-51.
62. See Ass’n of Comm. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edwards (ACORN), 81 F.3d 1387, 1392-94
(5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating part of the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§
300j-21 to 300j-26 (2006), which required each state to “establish a program” to assist local
educational agencies, schools, and day care centers in remedying potential lead contamination in
their drinking water systems on threat of civil enforcement proceedings); Bd. of Natural Res. v.
Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1993) (invalidating part of the Forest Resources
Conservation and Shortage Relief Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-620j (2006), which significantly
restricted the export of unprocessed timber harvested from state, but not privately owned, public
lands in the western continental United States, and which required states to issue regulations
implementing the export ban). A question worth exploring is why New York and Printz have had
so little generative force to date. Possible explanations include: (1) few federal laws commandeer;
(2) states do not want to challenge some federal statutes that commandeer because of agreement
with them; (3) sometimes the costs to the states imposed by commandeering are minimal; and (4)
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In sum, the Court has categorically prohibited the federal
government from requiring states to enact, to administer, or to enforce
a federal regulatory program. Anticommandeering doctrine thus
disables the federal government from using the states as regulators; it
does not preclude the federal government from treating the states as
regulated entities.
II. A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ANTICOMMANDEERING DOCTRINE
A. The Federalism Costs of Commandeering
A
comprehensive
examination
of
anticommandeering
doctrine—one that includes but transcends the Supreme Court’s focus
on accountability—must account for the impact of federal regulation
on federalism values as a whole in light of the full range of
congressional options. The components of such an examination can be
captured by the following expected-value equation:
E(Cfed reg) = pfed reg * Cfed reg.63
E(Cfed reg) represents the expected costs to federalism values of a
federal regulation, whether commandeering, preemption, a choice
between commandeering and preemption, or conditional federal
spending.64 pfed reg is the probability that the federal government will
regulate, and Cfed reg identifies the costs to federalism values imposed
by the federal regulation. The probability of federal regulation (pfed reg)
is a function of the financial and political accountability costs
associated with engaging in federal regulation. The costs to federalism
values (Cfed reg) sound in economics, public policy, and politics. They
include: (1) the costs to states, in terms of time and money, of
complying with or implementing a federal regulation,65 including
states may fear that preemption would follow a successful challenge to a commandeering law,
and preemption would be worse from their perspective.
63. The equation in the text is not essential to advance the argument. But the equation
usefully underscores that federalism values are affected by both the probability of federal
regulation and the federalism costs imposed by such regulation. As explored below, moreover,
the equation captures the counterintuitive theoretical tradeoff among federalism values that
anticommandeering doctrine can generate.
64. This inquiry uses the term “regulation” in a generic, non-technical sense, a sense that
includes use of the conditional spending power. See infra note 74 (distinguishing mandatory from
non-mandatory forms of federal regulation).
65. Professor Vicki Jackson notes the possible “difference . . . between Congress requiring
the states to do something that costs a lot (in terms of time or money) [and] something that does
not.” Jackson, supra note 12, at 2202. She argues that such a concern “would not justify a flat
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opportunity costs;66 (2) the loss (or imposition) of regulatory control
that federal regulation may demand; and (3) the accountability costs
(and associated voter disapproval) that federal regulation may require
states to incur and allow the federal government to avoid.67
Thus, accountability concerns implicate both the probability of
federal regulation and the federalism costs that such regulation
imposes. Professor Jackson usefully identifies three distinct
dimensions to the “political accountability” argument:
First, voters may hold state officers politically accountable for a choice that was not
theirs, or which the officers were forced by federal law to make, without appreciating
the source of the substantive rule or the forced nature of the decision, respectively.
Second, voters may fail to hold federal officials politically accountable for choices they do
make that impose further choices, or costs, on state governments. And third, federal
legislators may not themselves feel as politically accountable, and responsible, if they
can direct states to carry out programs (especially if these programs are not financed
from federal revenues).68

Professor Jackson’s third type of accountability concern affects the
probability of federal regulation; her first and second categories
implicate both the probability of federal regulation and the federalism
costs imposed by such regulation.
anticommandeering rule, but might instead lead to rules that focus on the substantiality of the
burdens, or the possibility of federal subsidy or waiver for localities for which a requirement is
particularly burdensome.” Id. at 2202-03 (footnotes omitted).
66. These costs are critical not as ends of federalism in themselves, but because
commandeering “absorbs government resources that the states might direct elsewhere.” Deborah
Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1563, 1580 & n.65 (1994); see also Jackson, supra note 12, at 2204 (“[T]he more substantial the
burden, the greater the possibility that state officers will be unable to attend to state business
because of the need to carry out federal directives.”). Professor H. Jefferson Powell’s defense of
New York sounds in the related prudential considerations of state “initiation” and “immunity.”
H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 63, 686-87 (1993).
Likewise, Professor Caminker, although generally critical of anticommandeering doctrine, agrees
that “[w]hen Congress requires states to fund an expensive enforcement program, the state
might be forced to respond by diverting energies and funds from existing state programs in order
to comply with the federal mandate. In this fashion ‘unfunded mandates’ can generate what
might non-technically be called externalities; not only do they constrain state discretion over the
subject matter being federally regulated, but the costs they impose can pressure the state to cut
back on unrelated programs.” Caminker, supra note 14, at 1079-80.
67. The equation in the text might seem oversimplified because it assumes that federal
regulation imposes only costs from the standpoint of federalism values, not benefits. Federal
regulation may be beneficial for any number of reasons. For instance, the federal government
may be best equipped to deal with a problem confronting citizens of the state, perhaps because
interstate externalities like pollution are present. This inquiry’s exclusive focus on costs can be
justified, however, because the various federalism benefits conferred by federal regulation can be
expressed analytically in terms of negative costs. Consider, for example, the “take title” provision
at issue in New York, which alleviated a collective action problem between the sited and unsited
states. See supra Part I; infra Part III. Such federal legislation is properly viewed as enhancing
state regulatory control and thus as reducing the federalism costs imposed by federal regulation.
68. Jackson, supra note 12, at 2201.

1644

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:5:1629

B. The Standard Account of Anticommandeering Doctrine
Anticommandeering doctrine vindicates federalism values69 not
only to the extent that it reduces the financial and accountability costs
of federal regulation (the first and third components of Cfed reg), but
also to the extent that it forces the federal government to internalize
more of the financial and accountability costs associated with
regulating.70 As law and economics posits, actors that do not
internalize the full costs of their behavior tend to engage in too much
of the behavior.71 The same holds true for government regulators. All
other things being equal, anticommandeering doctrine reduces the
expected costs of federal regulation (E(Cfed reg)) by lowering the
probability of such regulation (pfed reg).72
In this regard, anticommandeering doctrine advances
federalism values in two ways. First, the doctrine reduces the
probability that preemptive federal regulation will be enacted. It does
so because the federal government may not be willing to bear all of the
financial costs of such regulation, and anticommandeering doctrine
prohibits cost externalization through commandeering.73 Second, the
69. For a discussion of the various values that federalism is thought to advance, see infra
notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
70. Note that the federal government does not internalize all of the costs of federal
regulation when it preempts state law because states are bound by valid federal law and often
must incur costs to comply. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 40-42 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing externalities and the role of law in encouraging the internalization of external costs).
72. Accord Caminker, supra note 14, at 1073 (“Congress might enact a commandeering
statute where, absent this possibility, it would have enacted no federal legislation at all. The
result is an increase in the total quantity of federal legislation, shifting exercised regulatory
power from the states to the federal government.”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) (arguing that “the anticommandeering doctrine helps
shore up the political safeguards of federalism by forcing the national government to internalize
the costs—both fiscal and political—of its actions”); id. at 127-28 (discussing the “two kinds of
costs” that “[f]orbidding commandeering requires the national government to internalize”).
Professor Young assumes that the federal government internalizes all of the benefits of federal
regulation. The optimal level of federal regulation would change if this assumption were false in
a particular setting. For example, public confusion might allow state officials to reap some of the
political rewards for popular federal regulations that the states had no hand in enacting or
implementing. In this scenario, cost-benefit efficiency might be advanced by having the federal
government externalize some of the costs of federal regulation in addition to some of the benefits.
73. The financial costs to the federal government of preemption vary widely depending on
the context. Sometimes the costs are negligible. For instance, if Congress imposed requirements
for nuclear-waste disposal, the federal government would externalize most of the financial costs.
Private businesses that produce such waste would need to make arrangements with states that
possess disposal facilities. At other times, however, the costs are substantial. For example, it
likely would have been very expensive for the federal government to have conducted all
background checks on would-be firearms purchasers from the moment the Brady Act went into
effect. See supra Part I (discussing Printz); infra Part III (same).
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ban on commandeering prevents any kind of mandatory federal
regulation when preemption does not constitute a feasible
congressional alternative.74 Preemption will not always be reasonably
available, at least in the short run, as is suggested by the difficulty of
conceiving
feasible
preemptive
alternatives
in
Printz.75
Anticommandeering doctrine cannot compromise state regulatory
authority when more onerous regulatory alternatives are not available
to the federal government.
This cost-internalization rationale for anticommandeering
doctrine provides a relatively clear, analytically tractable principle
that is ideologically evenhanded. Events that occurred shortly after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate this rationale for
anticommandeering doctrine.76 For example, the federal government
asked state and local law enforcement officers to help execute a
“nationwide plan to interview as many as 5,000 Mideast men ages 18
to 33 here on visas.”77 While most state and local law enforcement
officials obliged, “[t]he Portland, Ore., chief said his department
wouldn’t assist the government, while Ann Arbor Police Chief Daniel
Oates–with 79 people in his city to be interviewed–ha[d]n’t committed
to allowing his officers to conduct interviews.”78 Because of
anticommandeering doctrine, the federal government could not
require state and local law enforcement officers to conduct the
interviews. In this instance, the unavailability of commandeering
advanced the values not only of federalists but also of civil
libertarians.79
74. Conditional federal spending does not constitute a form of mandatory federal regulation
because states may escape regulation by declining the associated federal funding. See infra Part
II.D.
75. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
76. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004) (discussing the several states and many local governments that have
resisted the perceived excesses of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT
ACT”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001), either by announcing their disapproval
or by ordering their law enforcement personnel not to cooperate in enforcing the law); Ernest A.
Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (2004) (arguing that “the question of the national
government’s ability to require state and local cooperation with federal anti-terrorism
initiatives . . . illustrates the several different ways in which federalism promotes and protects
individual freedom”).
77. David Shepardson, FBI to Help Question 650 Men, THE DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 27, 2001,
at 1A.
78. Id.
79. To recognize the force of this example, one need not agree that the PATRIOT Act in
particular compromises civil liberties. The ratio of state and local to federal law enforcement
personnel in the United States is greater than 10 to 1. See Young, supra note 76, at 1281
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C. Problematizing the Standard Theory
All other things being equal, therefore, anticommandeering
doctrine reduces the expected costs of federal regulation by lowering
the probability of such regulation. But—and this is a potentially big
“but”—all other things are not always equal when the Court removes
commandeering as an option. Anticommandeering doctrine may
increase the costs of federal regulation (Cfed reg) because the
unavailability of commandeering may result in more instances of
federal preemption going forward. And preemption, an obvious and
constitutional alternative to commandeering,80 may impede the
vindication of federalism values not only by raising accountability
problems of its own, but also by reducing the regulatory roles of the
states at the level of policy implementation.81 When states are
commandeered, they retain (often significant) discretion to determine
how to implement the federal mandate. Preemption, by contrast,
bypasses state regulatory authority.82 In a New York-type situation,
(contrasting the more than one million state and local law enforcement personnel with the
roughly 93,000 full-time federal law enforcement personnel from surveys conducted in 2000 and
2002, respectively); see also William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J.
2137, 2181 (2002) (documenting that the overwhelming majority of law enforcement personnel
nationwide are state and local police officers). “At least in the short term,” therefore, “the FBI
and other federal law enforcement institutions are unlikely to cover the many responsibilities
that ‘homeland security’ entails without substantial state and local assistance.” Young, supra
note 76, at 1281. See also Althouse, supra note 76, at 1232 (“[I]n carrying out the massive federal
effort needed to deal with terrorism after September 11, 2001, the national government
inevitably looks to the vast number of police, health workers, and other personnel employed at
the state and local government levels.”). Because anticommandeering doctrine requires Congress
to internalize more of the costs of regulation before regulating, the doctrine can help to safeguard
civil liberties any time a proposed federal law would compromise them–either by reducing the
likelihood of enactment or by reducing enforcement.
Of course, there is a flip side. Federal legislation aimed at protecting constitutional rights
would also be less likely to be enacted or enforced in the presence of a commandeering ban. More
generally, the ban impedes realization of any national interest, no matter how weighty or
legitimate, that the federal government may seek to advance. Examining the various regulatory
options “from a federalism perspective,” as this inquiry does, does not take all of the relevant
constitutional values into account.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 50.
81. Another option at Congress’ disposal is use of the conditional spending power. See supra
notes 3, 51 and accompanying text (discussing Dole); infra Part II.D (analyzing the conditional
spending power from a federalism perspective). Still another alternative would be for Congress to
give states a choice between being preempted and being commandeered. See supra notes 44, 52
and accompanying text (discussing the New York Court’s validation of this approach); infra Part
IV.D (analyzing the implications of the availability of this alternative for the legitimacy of
commandeering from a federalism perspective).
82. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 14, at 1002, 1006-07 (“In some situations Congress can
even use state intermediaries as a means of preserving a significant role for state discretion in
achieving specified federal goals, where the alternative is complete federal preemption of any
state regulatory role. . . . Indeed, on occasion this approach allows Congress to govern in a
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for example, states that regulate low-level radioactive waste in
accordance with federal instructions have more say regarding how
such waste is regulated than states whose regulatory activities are
preempted by federal law. In the Printz scenario, to consider another
example, Congress (at least theoretically) could have created a federal
bureaucracy to conduct the background checks from the moment that
the Brady Act went into effect.83 Federalists, who presumably want
states to participate in regulating gun possession, might sensibly
prefer commandeering to preemption.
A key factor, therefore, is the likelihood that the federal
government will preempt in the future if the Court disallows
commandeering. This probability may depend on whether there are
constitutional limits on preemption,84 and whether Congress and the
President have incentives to preempt, as opposed to regulating in
some other way or not regulating at all. To account for this question,
the simple equation that captures the expected costs of federal
regulation E(Cfed reg)85 can be disaggregated as follows:
E(Cfed reg) = E(Ccommandeer) + E(Ccond spend) + E(Cno fed reg) + E(Cpreempt).
E(Ccommandeer) represents the expected costs to federalism values
commandeering; E(Ccond spend) indicates the expected costs
conditional federal spending; E(Cno fed reg) denotes the expected costs
no federal regulation; and E(Cpreempt) is the expected costs
preemption. Now let

of
of
of
of

E(Ccommandeer) = pcommandeer * Ccommandeer,
E(Ccond spend) = pcond spend * Ccond spend,
E(Cno fed reg) = pno fed reg * Cno fed reg, and
E(Cpreempt) = (1- pcommandeer - pcond spend - pno fed reg) * Cpreempt,

decentralized manner that is more respectful of state autonomy.”); id. at 1011 (distinguishing
“two basic commandeering techniques”–that is, “ministerial mandates” and “bounded discretion
mandates”–the latter of which “order state officials to reach a specified federal objective, but
afford these officials some degree of discretion in deciding how to do so,” an approach that “is
particularly supportive of states’ political discretion” and “enhances the prospect that the
resulting policy will reflect local needs and concerns as well as the national interest”).
83. Congress could not have required licensed gun dealers to abide by the federal regulation
directly because a computer database was not immediately available. See infra notes 147, 190
and accompanying text.
84. See infra Part IV.C.
85. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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where px represents the probability of x federal action, and (1pcommandeer - pcond spend - pno fed reg) stands for the probability of preemption.
It follows that
E(Cfed reg) = (pcommandeer * Ccommandeer) + (pcond spend * Ccond spend) + (pno fed reg *
Cno fed reg) + [(1- pcommandeer - pcond spend - pno fed reg) * Cpreempt].86
As this symbolic representation underscores, the critical issue
is the size of pcond spend and pno fed reg. As pcond spend and pno fed reg approach
0, a judicial ban on commandeering will result in preemptive
regulation, for the probability of preemption will approach 1. As pcond
spend or pno fed reg approaches 1, anticommandeering doctrine yields no
mandatory federal regulation. To reiterate, the relative sizes of the
various probabilities depend upon constitutional constraints and upon
the incentives of Congress and the President to condition federal funds
on state compliance with federal regulatory demands, to preempt in
the areas covered by the Court’s anticommandeering doctrine, or to
give up on regulating the activity in question.
When pcond spend and pno fed reg are small, commandeering (absent
anticommandeering doctrine) and preemption are left as the only
options, creating a potential tradeoff between lines of accountability
and the exercise of state regulatory power.87 The threat that federal
preemption—and thus the preemption-encouraging ban on
commandeering—poses to state retention of regulatory control is
significant not because state regulatory control is important for its
own sake. Rather, the key point is that state regulatory autonomy is
needed to realize the values that federalism is typically thought to
advance, including accountability. That is, state regulatory autonomy
remains critical no matter which of the commonly proffered virtues of
federalism are under consideration.
Specifically, tyranny prevention is said to be advanced when
multiple levels of government compete for political power.88
86. One could complicate matters further by including a choice between commandeering
and preemption. See infra Part IV.D. The text omits this potential option to simplify the
exposition. The text could easily be adjusted to incorporate this alternative.
87. Thus the implications for political accountability of Professor Caminker’s
commandeering categories, see supra note 82, are the opposite of their implications for state
regulatory control. As Professor Jackson observes, “statutes that offer substantial discretion to
the states in carrying out a substantial, federally mandated duty might pose a greater threat to
the clarity of responsibility and thus to political accountability than do statutes imposing more
limited, ministerial duties.” Jackson, supra note 12, at 2203-04.
88. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of
the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power. The constitutionally mandated
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers
to ensure the protection of our fundamental liberties. . . . [A] healthy balance of power between
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Democratic self-government is supposed to be facilitated when there
exists a robust space for participatory politics at levels closer to the
people who are governed.89 Political responsiveness and accountability
are believed to be encouraged when states compete for mobile citizens
who can vote with not just their hands but also their feet.90 Value
pluralism is promoted when state policies are allowed to differ along
various dimensions of cultural difference.91 Social problem solving can
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.” (internal citations omitted)); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 790 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur federal system provides a salutary check on
governmental power.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 S. Ct. REV. 341, 38095.
89. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns . . . .
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes . . . .”); Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[F]ederalism enhances the
opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government. Alexis de Tocqueville
understood well that participation in local government is a cornerstone of American democracy.”)
(discussing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 181 (H. Reeve trans., 1961));
Rapaczynski, supra note 88, at 395-408.
90. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint
sovereigns . . . makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a
mobile citizenry.”); ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 129-30 (2000) (analyzing
the circumstances in which mobile citizens contribute to the efficient delivery of local public
goods); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149
(1992) (arguing for competition among states); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The
Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73 (Dennis C. Mueller ed.,
1997) (providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an efficient allocation of
citizens across jurisdictions); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956) (providing the first formulation of the mobility problem). Responsiveness and
accountability are interrelated because one way to ensure responsiveness is not through exit but
through voice – i.e., voting politicians out of office or pressuring them. This is typically what is
meant by accountability. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
91. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint
sovereigns . . . assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society . . . .”). Contemporary examples abound, including some of the
most controversial issues in American culture: abortion, gay marriage, and physician-assisted
suicide. Whatever one thinks of value pluralism normatively regarding a particular issue, it is
uncontroversial descriptively that uniform federal rules prevent different parts of the country
from governing themselves in ways that vary across the nation. This is so regardless of whether
the federal rule takes the form of: (1) a constitutional decision by the Court, see, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); (2) a proposed constitutional amendment, see, e.g., Jim Rutenberg,
Bush Calls for an Amendment Banning Same-Sex Nuptials, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, § 1, at 30
(quoting President Bush as championing the amendment); or (3) a federal statute interpreted by
the federal government to have broad preemptive effect, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct.
904 (2006) (holding that the federal Controlled Substances Act does not permit the Attorney
General to forbid doctors from prescribing federally regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted
suicide under state law permitting the practice).
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be encouraged when states are allowed to act as policy “laboratories.”92
Finally, the efficient delivery of local public goods by states saves
various costs when they make more cost-effective choices than the
federal government would make for the nation as a whole.93 When
federal preemption reduces state regulatory control—and thus the
ability of states to make choices, including resource choices94—all of
these federalism values can be compromised.95

92. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint
sovereigns . . . allows for more innovation and experimentation in government . . . .”); Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 788-89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Courts and
commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the
development of new social, economic, and political ideas. This state innovation is no judicial
myth.” (footnotes omitted)); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”). But see Rapaczynski, supra note 88, at 408-14 (criticizing the
experimentation rationale for federalism).
93. For example, Rust Belt states favored national emissions standards for factories to
reduce or eliminate a competitive advantage enjoyed by Sun Belt states in the competition for
new industry. If the only standards were air quality standards, the Sun Belt states could offer
less pollution control because their air was cleaner. So the Rust Belt states lobbied for a federal
requirement that every new factory of a certain type had to install the same abatement
technology. See generally B. Peter Pashigan, Environmental Protection: Whose Interests are Being
Protected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985) (analyzing votes on critical Clean Air Act amendments
and verifying that Rust Belt legislators voted to nationalize these rules); see also Robert
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics,
54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 285 (1991) (observing that “when differential geographical
benefits are at stake, congressional voting patterns fall out along remarkably congruent
geographical lines, suggesting that congresspeople are aware of the legislation’s geographic
implications, and that they vote consistently with the theory of pessimistic pluralism”).
94. See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1974) (stating that
application of federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions will “significantly alter or
displace the States’ abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These
activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual
functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services. Indeed, it is functions
such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as these which the States
have traditionally afforded their citizens.”).
95. For recent discussions of the various values that federalism might be thought to serve,
see STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 56-69
(2005); DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA. L. REV. 903 (1994). For an overview
of the normative federalism debate in American constitutional law and citations to the relevant
literature, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-12 (2d ed. 2005).
Of course, legal and political debates about federalism are relevant beyond the United States
and Europe, see infra Part II.E. Such debates are particularly significant in societies embroiled
in ethnic conflict. For a fascinating study of the circumstances in which federalism can be
employed as a structural technique to reduce ethnic conflict, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC
GROUPS IN CONFLICT 597-98, 601-28 (1985) (showing how interethnic conflict may be reduced
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This is well-trodden intellectual ground, and this inquiry does
not take sides in the normative debate regarding the kinds of values
that a federal system should secure. Rather, this inquiry maintains
that state retention of regulatory control is needed to realize the
commonly understood values advanced by federalism,96 and then
argues that anticommandeering doctrine undermines federalism
values by reducing state regulatory control insofar as a greater
quantity of preemption results from the Court’s ban on
commandeering. If direct federal regulation removes states from the
regulatory scene, there is no meaningful sense in which they can
prevent federal tyranny, advance political participation, encourage
political responsiveness and accountability through interjurisdictional
and intrajurisdictional competition, express the distinctive value
commitments of the majority of their populations, serve as
laboratories of experimentation, or efficiently deliver public goods.
Accordingly, regardless of whether anticommandeering doctrine
advances political accountability on balance, the extent to which
states lose regulatory control is strongly associated with the extent to
which the U.S. federal system can vindicate the other values typically
thought to be advanced by federalism.97

through dispersion and arrangement of the governmental structure so that intraethnic conflict is
accentuated instead, and explaining the potential role of federalism in achieving these effects).
96. It is possible that state regulatory control could undermine federalism values in certain
circumstances. For example, federal preemption might advance accountability to a greater extent
than would state regulation if citizens were more attuned to the activities of their national
representatives than to the conduct of their local ones. If nationalization were shown
systematically to advance federalism values to a greater extent than state regulatory control, the
argument advanced in this inquiry would unravel. Of course, defenders of anticommandeering
doctrine, including the Court, are highly unlikely to conclude that the values typically associated
with federalism would be better advanced without federalism than with it.
97. In response, one could invoke Professors Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley’s
distinction between federalism as a constitutional requirement and the managerial concept of
decentralization. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 95, at 910 (“Decentralization is a managerial
concept; it refers to the delegation of centralized authority to subordinate units of either a
geographic or a functional character.”). Even in a world without judicially enforced federalism,
they argue, Congress and federal agencies could design experiments and try different approaches
to social problems in different regions of the nation. Similarly, the federal government could
preempt in such a way as to allow for regional participation, competition, expressions of value,
and efficient delivery of local public goods. (Tyranny prevention is another matter because the
central authority decides how much decentralization takes place in a world without federalism.)
Professors Feeley and Rubin make some powerful political points and raise an intriguing
theoretical possibility. But as the various federal laws discussed throughout this article
illustrate, experience shows that regional experimentation and encouragement of participation,
competition, diversity, and local efficiency are not what tends to happen when Congress
preempts state and local law. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1582 (2004) (“[I]t seems doubtful that the national
government has the right incentives to decentralize when it should.”). This is not to say,
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Of course, commandeering can trigger not just accountability
concerns, but also concerns about some of the other federalism values
discussed above. The Rehnquist Court stressed accountability,98 but
that Court’s focus should not control a comparative normative analysis
of commandeering and preemption from a federalism perspective.
Theoretically, Congress could commandeer in ways that sap state
regulatory control to as great an extent as would preemption. As a
general matter, however, such equivalence seems unlikely.99
Preemption bypasses the regulatory authority of the states;
commandeering does not. Thus, when commandeering allows states to
exercise discretion and make regulatory choices, a constitutional rule
that categorically bans commandeering while allowing preemption
with respect to the same subject matter makes little sense insofar as
federalism is supposed to preserve state regulatory autonomy.
The Court and commentators are correct that commandeering,
particularly an unfunded mandate, requires states to devote their
scarce resources to a particular issue while preemption leaves them
free to redirect their resources elsewhere.100 But if our federal system
would be better served if a state dedicated its time and money to Issue
#1 but not to Issue #2, then it is not much consolation, when the
federal government preempts regarding Issue #1, that the state can
redirect its energies to addressing Issue #2. From a federalism
perspective, it might be better if the state had been commandeered—
and funded by the federal government—regarding Issue #1.
Furthermore, if the federal government preempted the states as much
as constitutionally possible regarding all sorts of important problems,
federalism would not be well served just because the states were free
to commit their resources to the relatively trivial issues that
remained. Commandeering with respect to the more important policy
matters would likely be preferable.101
When preemption is a feasible alternative, the relevant costbenefit questions for a federalism concerned with state regulatory
control are: (1) whether anticommandeering doctrine causes the
probability of federal regulation (pfed reg) to decline; (2) whether
however, that Congress could not choose to do some significant decentralizing. Indeed,
decentralization is a concept that is analytically connected to a central or national perspective.
98. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text (quoting New York).
99. It is also conceptually unclear how Congress could commandeer in ways that sap state
regulatory control to a greater extent than preemption when both are available. See infra Part
IV.E.
100. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
101. Cf. BREYER, supra note 95, at 59 (arguing that “the Court’s recent federalism decisions”
such as New York and Printz “paradoxically threaten to shift regulatory activity from the state
and local to the federal level—the likely opposite of their objective”).
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anticommandeering doctrine causes the federalism costs of federal
regulation (Cfed reg) to increase; and (3) whether it causes pfed reg to
decline more than it causes Cfed reg to increase.102 As with many
unresolved empirical questions, there is room for reasonable
disagreement on this issue. But even pre-empirically, some important
points can be made with some measure of confidence.
To begin with, anticommandeering doctrine may cause pfed reg to
decline little as a general matter. The doctrine, it is true, has taken
away a congressional option, and having fewer options with which to
accomplish a desired legislative objective should increase the costs of
imposing federal regulations, at least in some circumstances. The
upshot, theoretically, is less federal regulation.
The problem with such reasoning, however, is that the federal
government has numerous regulatory options at its disposal that
anticommandeering doctrine leaves untouched, from preemption, to
conditional federal spending, to giving states a choice between
commandeering and preemption. It is unlikely that all of these
alternatives would be significantly more expensive for the federal
government to exercise in a particular situation than commandeering
would be.
Moving from financial to accountability costs, it is difficult to
think of an instance in which Congress chose the commandeering
option with the intent or effect of externalizing political accountability
to a greater extent than exists when Congress regulates in some other
way. Nor is it straightforward conceptually to envision how Congress
could pursue such a course with any confidence that it would succeed
in “getting away with it.” If this is right, then requiring the federal
government to preempt (or regulate some other way) rather than to
commandeer—which the federal government has almost always
chosen to do voluntarily anyway103—does not lower pfed reg to a
significant extent, at least in many situations.
The claim that the probability of federal regulation is relatively
insensitive to the form that it takes raises some interesting questions.
First, it may not be apparent why the federal government would ever
choose to commandeer. Two possibilities, discussed further below in
102. When preemption is not a feasible alternative (and the Court bans commandeering), the
federalism costs imposed by mandatory federal regulation are irrelevant because the probability
of such federal regulation goes to zero.
103. In Printz, Justice Scalia observed for the majority that historically Congress has not
engaged in commandeering. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 989, 907 (1997). See supra text
accompanying note 56. For Justice Scalia, this historical lesson indicated that commandeering is
unconstitutional. Ironically, his observation may suggest that anticommandeering doctrine does
not advance federalism values to a significant extent because the doctrine does not appreciably
lower the probability of federal regulation.
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Parts III and IV, respectively, are that (1) the states sometimes prefer
commandeering to preemption, and they influence the federal
legislative process to this end, and (2) preemption is not always a
feasible alternative in the short run. Second, the suggestion that
anticommandeering doctrine causes the probability of federal
regulation to decline little may seem empirically suspect because
Congress did not impose a preemptive solution after New York.104 But
what happened ex post regarding the legislative problem reviewed in
New York or any other case proves nothing one way or the other. The
argument advanced by this inquiry is not that the Court should allow
commandeering with respect to issue X because otherwise Congress
will likely respond by preempting state action regarding issue X.
There are any number of reasons why a future Congress might not
(re)turn its attention to issue X: for example, different priorities,
resources, or members. The point, rather, is that if Congress knows it
cannot commandeer under any circumstances, ex ante it will be more
likely to preempt state and local regulations in enacting future laws
regarding issues X, Y, and Z.
Even if anticommandeering doctrine does not lower the
probability of federal regulation (pfed reg) to a significant extent because
the federal government will preempt (or regulate some other way)
rather than commandeer, the question remains whether preemption,
as compared with commandeering, imposes greater federalism costs
(Cfed reg) in the form of lost regulatory control than it potentially saves
states in terms of both accountability and scarce financial resources.105
104. See, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, OUR GOVERNING LEGISLATION, LOWLEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985, http://www.nrc.gov/who-weare/governing-laws.html#llrwpaa-1985 (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (“This Act gives States the
responsibility to dispose of low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders . . . .”);
CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS IB92059: CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL, July 30, 2001,
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Waste/waste2.cfm?&CFID=569153&CFTOKEN=46244765#_1_19 (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (“Disposal of
low-level radioactive waste, which generally consists of low concentrations of relatively shortlived radionuclides, is a state responsibility under the 1980 Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act and 1985 amendments.”).
105. Typically, the financial costs to the states associated with preemption are lower than
the costs associated with commandeering because states incur implementation costs only when
they are commandeered. Commandeering requires states to devote state resources to federal
priorities; preemption usually prevents states from using their resources in federally prohibited
ways. Preemption, however, imposes greater costs on states than does commandeering in certain
circumstances. Preemption can impose significant costs on the states if they must meet
burdensome federal standards in pursuing their activities in areas where these activities are also
performed by private individuals. Examples might include operating cars or running a utility.
Imagine two possibilities: (1) Congress requires the states to decrease pollution by X amount; or
(2) Congress imposes standards for pollution control that require the most expensive abatement
technology, standards that are far more costly than states would be allowed to choose under (1).
Even when states are not market participants, moreover, preemption can impose significant
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This is an important empirical question, the answer to which likely
depends on the circumstances.106 Yet it is a striking feature of the
contemporary anticommandeering doctrine that the Court does not
pause to consider these dimensions of the problem. Indeed, the the
Court’s ban on commandeering is so broad,107 so context insensitive,
that it applies not just in the face of a compelling government interest
(for example, commandeering of state and local officials in the wake of
a terrorist attack or devastating hurricane).108 The ban also applies
when accountability concerns are minimal (perhaps because Congress,
the states, and the media have taken steps to clarify the extent to
which the federal government is in charge), and when preemption
would impose huge costs on the states relative to commandeering,
both financially and in terms of lost regulatory control. This does not
seem a sensible outcome to the extent that the animating purpose of
anticommandeering doctrine is (or should be) the federalist enterprise
of protecting state autonomy.
D. Conditional Federal Spending
Unlike preemption or commandeering, Congress’s use of its
conditional spending power—conditioning federal funds on the
agreement of the states to be commandeered—does not constitute a
costs on them. Imagine that after New York, Congress enacted super-strict waste storage
requirements, and no private business could afford to comply with them. States with such
businesses in their jurisdictions would then have to spend money to subsidize them, or else
would risk losing them and all of the associated tax revenue, jobs, and other economic benefits–
either because the businesses would leave for another jurisdiction or would have to shut down.
106. It is one thing to call a question “empirical” and another to resolve it with empirical
evidence. It is difficult, if not impossible, to investigate rigorously the extent to which
anticommandeering doctrine advances or thwarts the vindication of federalism values in various
circumstances. The chief obstacles lie in calculating the relevant probabilities and in deriving a
common metric according to which the various costs can be compared. Financial costs are by
definition measured in monetary terms, but the problem of monetizing accountability and
regulatory-control costs seems intractable as a general matter. The analyst cannot ask states
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid accountability or to retain regulatory control.
Nor are the preferences of state officers the relevant concern. See infra Part IV.B. The most that
can be hoped for empirically in light of the inevitable lack of knowledge is the context-sensitive,
rough balancing of incommensurable values that is typical of doctrinal analysis in constitutional
law. Regardless, anticommandeering doctrine would be improved if the Court took all of the
relevant costs into account, not just political accountability. In cases in which the record is
particularly clear, moreover, empirical problems will not pose a serious difficulty to sound
constitutional analysis of the relevant considerations. See infra Part III (discussing New York).
107. For a discussion of “breadth” and “depth” as characteristics of judicial decision making,
see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory In Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at
the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005) (analyzing Sunstein’s theory of judicial
minimalism).
108. See infra Part V.
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mandatory form of federal regulation. States, in other words, may
avoid being commandeered by turning down the money. As noted
above,109 Justice O’Connor stressed for the New York Court that
Congress may place strings on federal grants in the commandeering
context.
Although Justice O’Connor distinguished conditional spending
from commandeering on grounds of coercion and thus
accountability,110 commentators have debated vigorously whether
many forms of conditional federal spending are actually mandatory in
practice because the Rehnquist Court declined to put teeth into Dole’s
non-coercion requirement.111 To the extent one believes that particular
uses of the conditional spending power are non-coercive, so that states
have a reasonable choice in deciding whether to accept or to turn down
federal dollars, it may not seem apparent how putting strings on
federal money might compromise accountability values as much as
commandeering. While commandeering leaves states with no choice, a
state can turn down a conditional grant and thereby avoid being
commandeered.
One response to this point regarding accountability is to reject
the premise and to maintain that state officials have no reasonable
choice but to accept large quantities of federal money in many
situations, so that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York draws
distinctions often without a relevant real-world difference. For
example, no state realistically could afford to give up highway money
from the government in Dole.112 Certain conditions can be quite
coercive; it is extraordinarily difficult to draw a line beyond which a
condition becomes coercive, and thus conditional spending can be as
coercive as commandeering or preemption.

109. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
110. Coercion and accountability are related in that state officials are appropriately held
accountable for accepting conditional federal grants if and only if they had a choice in the
matter–that is, they were not coerced into accepting the conditions in order to get the money. If
coercion exists, conditional spending may give the false impression of a choice. What it means for
state officials to “have a choice in the matter” is a nettlesome question. Must the choice be
merely possible or must it also be rational, reasonable, or something more demanding?
111. See generally Siegel, supra note 3 (collecting exemplary sources that take different
positions on this issue); see also supra note 51 (stating the non-coercion requirement).
112. See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental
Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 160-61 (2001) (“As a practical matter, states will not
reject large sums of money offered by Congress unless the conditions are unduly repressive. . . .
South Dakota, Nevada, and Virginia sued to invalidate conditions attached to the receipt of
federal highway trust funds. However, upon losing their suits, the states promptly complied with
the conditions. Federal funds trumped state principles.” (footnotes omitted)); supra note 51
(discussing Dole).
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From a federalism perspective, however, a potentially crucial
difference exists between conditional federal spending on the one hand
and commandeering or preemption on the other. This difference
concerns relative financial and opportunity costs.113 With conditional
federal spending, states “get paid” in exchange for their agreement to
be commandeered. To the extent that conditional spending pays the
costs of federal regulation, it avoids the problem of displacing state
and local budget choices underscored by the Court in National League
of Cities.114 With commandeering or preemption, by contrast, states
may face an unfunded mandate and may thus have to forgo other
regulatory priorities.115
There does not seem to be much difference between conditional
spending and commandeering in terms of regulatory control. This is
because under conditional spending the federal government gives the
money in exchange for the states’ agreement to be commandeered. A
difference exists only to the extent one views state choices between the
money and the commandeering as itself an exercise of regulatory
control. Moving beyond the commandeering context and considering
conditional grants in general, the degree of state regulatory control
depends on the specificity with which Congress sets the conditions.
Conditions can be general and leave great flexibility (for example, “set
a reasonable speed limit”), or they can be specific (for example, “set a
55 mph speed limit”). The amount of regulatory control retained by
states depends on the type of condition established.
Overall, the relative impact of conditional spending from a
federalism perspective depends on context, and it would be perilous to
attempt a rank ordering of different forms of federal regulation
according to their impact on federalism values. Based on the foregoing
analysis of the conditional spending power, the most that can be said
in general is that the Court has shown too much concern about
accountability in the commandeering context and arguably too little
concern about accountability when federal regulation takes the form of
conditional spending. In addition, the Court has undermined
federalism values by paying essentially no attention to the relative
impact of different forms of federal regulation on state budgets and
decision making capabilities. Thus, the Court’s general categories
distinguishing permissible from impermissible kinds of federal
legislation do not withstand a functional analysis grounded in the
values typically associated with federalism.
113. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 66, 105 and accompanying text.
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E. A Transnational Comparison
The federalism consequences of reduced regulatory control at
the state level are borne out by the European experience. The general
view of member states of the European Union on commandeering is
the opposite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s position:116 member states
tend to prefer directives to regulations. Directives “command a
Member State to regulate in a particular area and thus require
further Member State legislative action to become fully effective
within that state,” while regulations “have immediate legal force for
individuals within a Member State.”117 The European judgment is that
directives leave member states with more regulatory power.118 In a
relatively rare instance of comparative analysis on the U.S. Supreme
Court, Justice Breyer flagged this perceived virtue of commandeering
across the Atlantic:
At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local
control is better maintained through application of a principle that is the direct opposite
of the principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution. The federal
systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide
that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of
the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central “federal” body. . . . They do
so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the
independent authority of the “state,” member nation, or other subsidiary government,
and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.119

116. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of
Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 800, 801 (2004) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment
decisions “stand in striking contrast to the analogous doctrines of the European Court of
Justice,” and exploring some of the “reasons for welcoming ‘commandeering’ in the European
Union but not in the United States”).
117. Halberstam, supra note 14, at 214-15 (“In the European Union, by contrast [to the
United States], the subject of concern is not Union action that ‘commandeers’ Member State
legislative or administrative bodies, but EU legislative activity that has direct effect in the legal
systems of the Member States. Member States tend not to welcome Community regulations,
which have immediate legal force for individuals within a Member State, and instead prefer that
the Community pass directives, which command a Member State to regulate in a particular area
and thus require further Member State legislative action to become fully effective within that
state. So, too, ‘commandeering’ is a basic feature of German federalism . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
See also COOTER, supra note 90, at 236 (discussing the difference between directives and
regulations in the law of the European Union).
118. Technically, both directives and regulations qualify as forms of “commandeering” under
Printz because most regulations in the European Union must be enforced by member state
institutions. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 14, at 213. Note, moreover, that even if one were to
dispute Professor Halberstam’s empirical judgment about member-state preferences, the key
point would remain that both directives and regulations are legal in the European Union.
119. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declined Justice Breyer’s
invitation to look abroad, deeming “such comparative analysis
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution.”120
Of course, dabbling in comparative law by contrasting legal
regimes briefly and at a high level of abstraction does not definitively
clarify the wisdom of current Tenth Amendment doctrine. Justice
Breyer rightly recognized that “we are interpreting our own
Constitution, and not those of other nations, and there may be
relevant political and structural differences between their systems
and our own.”121 Indeed, Daniel Halberstam’s analysis of institutional
dynamics in the United States and the European Union helps to
account for their opposite approaches to commandeering:
The US anti-commandeering rule exists in the context of a federal system marked by
independently constituted, independently competent levels of governance that
coexist . . . with a powerful federal government whose sphere of influence has proven
difficult to contain by other means. Here, the anti-commandeering rule may be viewed
as a consensus-forcing device by separating independent tiers of governance and
requiring federal and State decision makers to reach agreement before working
together.122

According to Professor Halberstam, the legal and political
culture in Europe is different:
[T]he EU and Germany have both preserved . . . limitations on central government
expansion and mechanisms of component State control over central government norms.
Constitutional provisions and practical realities in both the EU and Germany make the
central governing structure in both systems dependent on the component States for
administrative services. And in both systems, component States are represented in their
corporate capacities in the central governing institutions. Thus, in the EU and in
Germany, commandeering is embedded within a system of consensus-forcing governance
with structural limitations on the expansion of the central government. . . .
[C]ommandeering may be viewed as a further mechanism to maintain the dependence of
the central government on the component States and to preserve a sphere for additional
component State input while carrying out central commands.123

The political safeguards of federalism are more present in Europe
than they are here.124
Moreover, the directive in European Union law (1) refers only
to commandeered legislation, not to executive action, as was at issue
120. Id. at 921 n.11.
121. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Halberstam, supra note 14, at 249.
123. Id. at 249-50 (footnote omitted).
124. See Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic
Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 677 (2005) (recharacterizing Professor
Halberstam’s findings in terms of “the political safeguards of federalism” and suggesting that
“Justice Breyer’s comments on German federalism [in Printz] can be used to enter a note of
caution about relying on bottom-line results without paying attention to the larger institutional
surrounding”).
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in Printz; (2) is specifically provided for in the European Union Treaty;
(3) is the only available instrument in some areas; and (4) is partly
justified by the very different doctrinal structures that characterize
the legal regimes of member states. Directives enable them to realize
given policy goals in a variety of legal systems, a concern less relevant
in the United States because differences among state laws are more
substantive and less doctrinal (perhaps excepting Louisiana).125
Accordingly, there exists a stronger textual basis for legislative
commandeering in the European Union than in the United States and
a greater need for state-level flexibility. Such wrinkles, however, do
not detract from Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the European
“experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.”126
Professor Halberstam’s examination of commandeering in Europe
verifies that commandeering affords states greater regulatory control
than does preemption.127
III. REVISITING NEW YORK AND PRINTZ
It is instructive to analyze New York and Printz according to
the foregoing analysis of anticommandeering doctrine. The key
question is whether the Court’s holdings make sense from a
federalism perspective when assessed according to their impact on the
probability of federal regulation, state regulatory control, political
accountability, and financial costs.
Based upon these criteria, the Court in New York was myopic
in its focus on accountability and it decided the case incorrectly even
on accountability grounds. Of course, New York is a familiar case by
now. But Justice White’s dissent warrants attention, even at this late
date, because familiarity may tend to facilitate forgetfulness. Justice
White reported that the legislation at issue “resulted from the efforts
of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of remedies to the waste
problem. They sought not federal preemption or intervention, but
125. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 14, at 213-14, 230-31.
126. Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 14, at 247-48 (“[P]roviding the central government
with the legal tools and practical powers to take independent action might . . . introduce a bias in
favour of centralization. Central-component system relations might atrophy and the central
government might come to rely increasingly on its own resources. . . . [T]he anti-commandeering
rule might have perverse effects, by prodding the central government to develop the bureaucracy
necessary to implement its policy without involving the component States. Where the central
government has the capacity to do this and expands central functions, the central infrastructure
might short-circuit what would have otherwise become a productive cooperative relationship
with component States.” (footnote omitted)).
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rather congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had
reached.” The National Governors’ Association (“NGA”) “recognized
that the Federal Government could assert its preeminence in
achieving a solution to this problem, but requested instead that
Congress oversee state-developed regional solutions.”128 Justice White
noted that the Senate had considered “a ‘federal’ solution” in July
1980.
The 1980 legislation, however, did not dispose of the matter (so
to speak) because of continuing interstate disputes:
[A]ttempts by states to enter into compacts and to gain congressional approval sparked
a new round of political squabbling between elected officials from unsited States, who
generally opposed ratification of the compacts that were being formed, and their
counterparts from the [still only three] sited States, who insisted that the promises
made in the 1980 Act be honored. . . . [T]he [NGA] organized more than a dozen
meetings to achieve a state consensus.
. . . A movement thus arose to achieve a compromise between the sited and the unsited
States, in which the sited States agreed to continue accepting waste in exchange for the
imposition of stronger measures to guarantee compliance with the unsited States’
assurances that they would develop alternative disposal facilities. . . . In sum, the 1985
Act was very much the product of cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained
among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction.129

As Justice White discussed, New York was an unsited state
that exported large amounts of low-level radioactive waste to sited
states. It took various actions that signified its approval of the
interstate negotiations and that allowed it to reap substantial benefits
from the ensuing bargain.130
Despite the empirical problems that impede a cost-benefit
inquiry in this area of constitutional law,131 the facts of New York
mitigate these problems. The probability of federal regulation was not
sensitive to the issue of commandeering versus preemption or some
other regulatory alternative. The problem was pressing, and Congress
was going to act one way or the other. Indeed, the states had to
persuade Congress not to engage in preemption and instead to impose

128. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 189-92 (White, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
129. Id. at 192-94 (internal citations omitted). See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The
Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495,
541-42 (1997) (“In New York . . . , the record of state participation in resolving an ongoing
problem at a national level through legislation to which states as such significantly contributed
is clear. There can be little doubt that the ‘safeguards of the federal structure’ were in play there,
if they ever can be said to be in play.” (footnotes omitted)).
130. New York, 505 U.S. at 196-99 (White, J., dissenting) (documenting various statements
and actions by New York officials signifying the state’s agreement with the efforts of the NGA
and the federal legislation that resulted).
131. See supra note 106.
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a commandeering sanction in the 1985 Act (among other measures) as
a way of disciplining unsited states, which had not lived up to their
promises.132 Although New York stopped supporting the
commandeering approach when its strategic situation changed ex
post, New York had approved it ex ante.133
Turning from the probability of federal regulation to the
various costs imposed on the states by federal regulation, two points
are apparent. First, while the commandeering at issue imposed
substantial liabilities on the states, the commandeering arrangement
reflected the states’ desire to retain regulatory control, which was why
they repeatedly asked Congress to stay its (concededly constitutional)
preemptive hand. Absent a threat of federal preemption (the worst
possible outcome from the states’ perspective), the states apparently
believed that a commandeering lever was needed to ensure compliance
with any interstate agreement, and thus to secure an agreement.
Second, there was little prospect of public confusion or the imposition
of undeserved accountability on the states because the states approved
the agreement formalized by Congress.
One could insist that the views of most state officials in the
interstate interactions leading up to New York are irrelevant because
Tenth Amendment doctrine does not exist for the sake of state officials
or even states; rather, federalism values serve the long-term liberty
and self-government interests of our nation’s citizens.134 On this view,
it does not matter that state officials may not care about
accountability, and indeed may try to evade accountability.135
But this generalization is far removed from the realities on the
ground in New York. The states wanted regulatory control, and they
were not trying to evade the political accountability that ought to
come with it. It seems a difficult task to construct a federalism
argument that removing the states from the regulatory scene through
preemption would have been preferable. A citizen of New York who
observed that her state was building a waste facility or taking title to
132. It is, of course, possible that Congress would not have passed preemptive legislation in
the event that a state-proposed solution failed to be enacted. Congress might not have acted on a
preemption threat for any number of reasons. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. But
the threat of preemption in New York does appear to have been real. See supra note 128 and
accompanying text.
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 35, 88 and accompanying text. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (“The
Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state
governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals.”).
135. See infra Part IV.B.
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low-level radioactive waste would not be wrongly inferring that the
state was responsible for the regulatory action. New York was author
of this regulatory action in the real sense that New York had sought,
approved, and reaped the benefits of the interstate negotiation process
that resulted in the commandeering.136 This is why Justice White
thought “[t]he State should be estopped from asserting the
unconstitutionality of a provision that seeks merely to ensure that,
after deriving substantial advantages from the 1985 Act, New York in
fact must live up to its bargain by establishing an in-state low-level
radioactive waste facility or assuming liability for its failure to act.”137
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor argued that
accountability concerns cut decisively in the opposite direction.138 As
explained immediately above, the level of abstraction at which she
cast her accountability analysis renders her conclusion vulnerable.
More problematic, however, was her failure to recognize the other
considerations relevant to the Tenth Amendment inquiry: the ex ante
probability of federal regulation, the federalism costs of forgone state
regulatory control, and the financial costs imposed by federal
regulation. The Court did not recognize, let alone adequately defend,
the apparent constitutional lesson of New York: accountability
concerns (as the Court sees them) are so important that they trump
not only the states’ ex ante desire for accountability, but also the other
determinants of whether a commandeering ban advances or
undermines the values of federalism.

136. One might respond that New York’s executive had helped to broker the deal, but New
York’s legislature would have born the electoral consequences of compliance because it was
required to identify and authorize a site within the state on which to build a waste facility. This
point, however, does seem a distinction without a decisive difference. New York, through its duly
elected representative, brokered an interstate deal and agreed to a certain way of dealing with
certain nuclear wastes. There is no reason to assume that only the state legislature could give
this consent. Such a requirement, moreover, would be unrealistic. The kind of interstate
negotiation and solution at issue in New York required the actions of state executives. Finally,
there is no indication that the New York legislature thought differently about the issue at the
time that the state executive acted. And if the legislature did in fact have a different view of the
matter, it could have voiced its disapproval publicly and told the electorate as much.
137. New York, 505 U.S. at 198-99 (White, J., dissenting). By contrast, Professor Jackson
argues that, “[i]n view of the length of time between enactment and imposition of the most severe
penalties, the scheme [in New York] created a significant risk that federal officials would receive
credit for solving a problem while passing the politically unpleasant decisions on to the states.”
Jackson, supra note 12, at 2203. Professor Jackson’s description, like Justice O’Connor’s,
proceeds from the assumption that the states, including New York, bore no responsibility for the
federal legislation. As discussed above, however, the states in New York were as responsible for
the law as was the federal government. It is therefore not clear wherein the accountability
problem lay.
138. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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New York provides another analytical lesson, which Justice
White implicitly identified:
[T]he practical effect of New York’s position is that because it is unwilling to honor its
obligations to provide in-state storage facilities for its low-level radioactive waste, other
States with such plants must accept New York’s waste, whether they wish to or not.
Otherwise, the many economically and socially beneficial producers of such waste in the
State would have to cease their operations. The Court’s refusal to force New York to
accept responsibility for its own problem inevitably means that some other State’s
sovereignty will be impinged by its being forced, for public health reasons, to accept New
York’s low-level radioactive waste. I do not understand the principle of federalism to
impede the National Government from acting as referee among the States to prohibit
one from bullying another.139

Justice White over claimed, because the implication of the majority’s
position was not that other states had to accept New York’s waste. The
other remedies, including federally sanctioned border closings,
remained in place. But the larger point remains: it can be
oversimplified to conceive constitutional federalism questions as
involving a power struggle between the federal government and “the
states.” Likewise, it can be oversimplified to ask whether
anticommandeering doctrine makes “the states” better or worse off in
various situations. In New York, the unsited states were the
immediate beneficiaries of the Court’s decision, while the three sited
states and Congress were the short-term losers. Yet over the long run,
it is difficult to see how “the states” were made better off by the
decision in New York, which likely rendered them less able to make
credible commitments to one another in the face of collective action
problems, and which may have left Congress less willing to stay its
regulatory hand in the future by forgoing preemption.140

139. New York, 505 U.S. at 199 (White, J., dissenting). As of October 2006, New York
remained one of only six states (plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) that had not
entered into a regional compact. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, LOW-LEVEL
WASTE COMPACTS, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/compacts.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2006).
140. Accord Caminker, supra note 14, at 1013 (In New York, “[e]ach state preferred to wait
and hope that its neighbor built a disposal site on which it could ‘free ride.’ To transcend this
prisoners’ dilemma, the states proposed a cooperative solution and sought congressional
enforcement to preclude defections. The congressional mandate of state action thus sought
merely to empower states to achieve self-generated objectives.” (footnote omitted)); Young, supra
note 72, at 113 (“The federal law at issue in New York . . . reinforced state-level policy efforts to
agree on shared responsibilities for radioactive waste disposal by providing a federal
enforcement mechanism. In this sense, federal action reduced constraints on state autonomy by
removing collective action impediments to state-level policymaking. . . . Recognition of the
anticommandeering rule in New York thwarted a national effort, supported by most states, to
help solve the difficult collective action problem of nuclear waste disposal. . . . [N]ational action
can sometimes empower state governments, and federalism doctrine needs to be sufficiently
flexible to address that possibility.” (footnote omitted)).
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Justice White’s exclamation to the effect that “this is madness;
the states wanted this!” misses a more fundamental objection to the
outcome in New York: regardless of what the states wanted,
commandeering was more protective of federalism values than was
the regulatory alternative in play—preemption.141 A persuasive
accountability argument in favor of the Court’s holding in New York
must explain why accountability problems potentially associated with
commandeering are so weighty that they trump the core federalist
priority of preserving state regulatory autonomy. Without state
retention of significant regulatory control, federalism cannot realize
its goals of preventing federal tyranny, promoting political
participation, encouraging responsiveness and accountability,
allowing expressions of value pluralism, providing state laboratories of
experimentation, and facilitating the efficient delivery of local public
goods.142
New York is arguably a stronger kind of Tenth Amendment
case than Printz from the standpoint of symbolic federalism and
political accountability values, at least if one abstracts away from the
particular facts of New York. Commandeering state legislatures and
forcing them to enact laws may constitute more of an intrusion and
infringement on state sovereign “dignity” than asking state law
enforcement personnel merely to enforce a federal law on an interim
basis.143 In the New York scenario, moreover, the inquiring citizen
would need to determine not only which sovereign was seeking to
control her behavior, but also whether one sovereign was forcing the
other sovereign to control her behavior through legislation. No such
informational complications exist in the Printz situation, where it
would be clear upon inquiry that the governing law is federal.144 These
differences may explain why many constitutional lawyers seem to

141. See supra text accompanying note 129 (discussing Congress’ consideration of a
preemptive solution to the interstate waste problem).
142. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
143. See infra Conclusion for a discussion of the role played by symbolism in the Court’s
federalism jurisprudence.
144. The two kinds of cases are more difficult to distinguish on financial grounds, because
compelling states to enforce federal laws can also require states to expend scarce and potentially
significant state resources. On the other hand, state courts are required to hear federal claims,
and state executive officers must enforce state-court decisions vindicating federal rights. See New
York, 505 U.S. at 178-79 (“[T]his sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text
of the Supremacy Clause.”); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). Both of these requirements are
costly, yet are allowed under the Court’s anticommandeering doctrine.
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agree that New York involved the stronger Tenth Amendment
challenge.145
From the standpoint of state regulatory control, however,
Printz is on firmer constitutional ground. As noted in Part II,
anticommandeering doctrine will not impede the realization of
federalism values when preemption is not reasonably available,
because the federal government will be just as unable to preempt as to
commandeer. The way preemption would work in New York is
straightforward: Congress could use its commerce power to dictate to
public and private owners of the waste how to dispose of the waste.
These congressional rules would preempt any other rules or
regulations. Then, if a waste storage crisis ensued because of
insufficient facilities around the country, states wanting businesses
that generated the waste to operate within their jurisdictions would
have to build storage facilities for waste that could not be moved out of
state. Otherwise, the businesses would have to move elsewhere or stop
operating.146
But Congress would have to do more than trump local laws
regarding background checks for preemption to succeed in Printz.
Because the absence of an instantly available computer database
made it impossible for Congress to require licensed gun dealers to
abide by the federal regulation directly, the federal government would
immediately have had to establish a large bureaucracy in order to

145. When Printz was pending before the Supreme Court, for example, Acting Solicitor
General Walter Dellinger argued that the decisive Tenth Amendment objections to the federal
law in New York had no relevance to the Brady Act:
The Brady Act provisions at issue here stand in marked contrast to those struck down
in New York. The law invalidated in New York was a “command [to] state government
to enact state regulation” (either by legislation or administrative initiative) to deal with
the problems of radioactive waste. 505 U.S. at 178 (emphasis in original). In
distinction, the Brady Act represents a clearly articulated congressional solution to the
problems posed by handgun violence, especially insufficiently effective regulation of
handgun transfers between private parties. The Brady Act does not require [Chief Law
Enforcement Officers] to make policy; rather, . . . the Act only requires state officials to
assist in the application of federal law to private parties in the course of their ordinary
duties. The Brady Act is therefore not an impermissible command to the States to
promulgate laws or regulations, but an unobjectionable requirement that officials
assist in “congressional regulation of individuals.” New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
Brief for the United States at 22, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 951503), 1996 WL 595005. This history suggests that ex ante, the Government viewed New York as
expressing a smaller principle than did Printz as eventually handed down by the Court.
146. Cf. supra note 105 (discussing related issues).

2006]

A FEDERALISM PERSPECTIVE

1667

conduct the checks. This costly prospect would have substantially
reduced the probability of mandatory federal regulation.147
Printz is thus more defensible than New York from the
perspective of state regulatory control. In his opinion for the Court in
Printz, Justice Scalia recognizes this point, and he appears
unwittingly to concede the independent importance of regulatory
control when he distinguishes New York:
Even assuming, moreover, that the Brady Act leaves no “policymaking” discretion with
the States, we fail to see how that improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon
state sovereignty. Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political
entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields
than . . . by “reduc[ing] [them] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.” It is an essential
attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and
autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.148

In light of the disciplined formalism that otherwise pervades his
opinion for the Court, this implicitly functional judgment is
noteworthy.
The foregoing assessment of Printz is a relative one. The
suggestion is not that Printz was decided correctly. Rather, the
argument is that, on grounds of relative regulatory control, Printz is
more defensible than New York from a federalism perspective if one
accepts anticommandeering, at least in some instances, as sound
constitutional doctrine. Whether Printz adequately accounts for the
interests of the national government is a distinct question. It is also
unclear in Printz how accountability costs trade off with the other
federalism costs imposed by federal regulation: loss of regulatory
control and financial costs. On the one hand, preemption does not
seem to have been a feasible possibility in the short run,149 and the
statute allowed states to exercise no real measure of regulatory
control. On the other hand, the expense borne by the states in
carrying out the federal mandate seemed modest.150 But the upshot of
147. Use of the conditional federal spending power would have remained an option. See
supra notes 3, 51 and accompanying text; supra Part II.D (analyzing the conditional spending
power from a federalism perspective).
148. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923, 928 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
149. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 147
(discussing the costliness of performing background checks).
150. In Printz, the Solicitor General underscored the minimal nature of the burden that the
Brady Act imposed on the states:
The text of the Brady Act requires only that CLEOs [Chief Law Enforcement Officers]
make a “reasonable effort” to conduct the record check, and the Act affords CLEOs
broad discretion to determine the scope of that “reasonable effort,” in light of their
own resources and law enforcement priorities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, which administers the Brady Act, has made clear in its guidance
interpreting the Act that it is generally “reasonable” for CLEOs to choose to fulfill
their duties by consulting readily accessible criminal records. Thus, in light of their
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the balancing analysis depends on how much one values
accountability as a constitutional concern in this setting, and the
extent to which one believes that the Brady Act compromised political
accountability, even though local law enforcement officers could have
simply informed would-be firearms purchasers that the federal
government was requiring them to conduct the background checks.151
Regardless, the Court should have addressed all of the relevant
considerations discussed above before imposing a broad and deep
anticommandeering rule in the name of the Constitution’s
commitment to federalism.152
IV. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS
This Part addresses various potential objections to the
argument advanced in this Article. First, an unsympathetic
commentator could argue that the foregoing “functional” analysis
sounds in politics or public policy, not constitutional law. Second, a
critic might submit that if the foregoing analysis is correct, there
would be no Tenth Amendment litigation because the states would
perform the cost-benefit tradeoff themselves and they would have no
interest in rendering themselves worse off. Third, a federalist could
object that the real problem here is not anticommandeering doctrine,
but the Supreme Court’s failure to limit preemption as an alternative
to commandeering. Fourth, one might insist that the Court has gotten
the doctrine exactly right from a federalism perspective because
Congress may give states the choice between commandeering and
preemption, and this option is clearly preferable to allowing
commandeering as well. Fifth, a critic might suggest that conditional
federal spending or another cooperative arrangement is more likely to
result than is preemption when Congress would like to commandeer
limited resources and competing obligations, CLEOs can and do meet their obligations
by having clerical personnel perform checks of criminal records to the extent possible
given the circumstances. The other requirements imposed on CLEOs under the Act
are even more clearly de minimis.
Brief for the United States at 12, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 951503), 1996 WL 595005. Yet the federal government would have been on stronger ground if it
had paid for the background checks of potential firearms purchasers. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text (arguing that an unfunded mandate compromises federalism values to a
greater extent than a funded mandate).
151. To alleviate accountability concerns, Congress might have required the transmission of
such information to potential purchasers and perhaps also mandated the posting of visible signs
in gun stores indicating that background checks were mandated by federal statute, not state or
local law.
152. See supra note 107 (referencing discussions of “breadth” and “depth” as characteristics
of judicial decision making); Siegel, supra note 107, at 1966 (characterizing New York and Printz
as “relatively broad and deep”).
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the states but the Court prohibits it from doing so. Sixth, a defender of
anticommandeering doctrine could argue that accountability concerns,
by
themselves,
are
sufficient
to
render
commandeering
unconstitutional. Seventh and finally, a proponent of the Court’s
anticommandeering doctrine might submit that this investigation
ignores the tradeoff between rules and standards, assuming that the
commandeering issue should be settled by a standard but neglecting
the clarity of rules, particularly in federalist systems, which
sometimes lack extensive state involvement in the national legislative
process.
The following sections address these criticisms in order. While
some of the objections have more force than others, none of them
ultimately undermines this inquiry’s claim that anticommandeering
doctrine indefensibly ignores the doctrine’s impact on state regulatory
control.
A. Law or Politics?
This functional analysis of anticommandeering doctrine will
mean different things to different people, depending on their views
concerning foundational questions of constitutional interpretation and
the sources of constitutional law. For some, the level of state
regulatory control encouraged by Supreme Court decisions qualifies as
a jurisprudential argument.153 For others, however, it is merely a
policy position the relevance of which is limited to the legislative
process or to issues of constitutional design or amendment. The same
could be said of the Court’s accountability concerns and the present
inquiry’s consideration of financial burdens.
To be clear, the presumption underlying this inquiry is not that
issues of regulatory control, political accountability, and financial
costs necessarily provide the relevant normative criteria by which to
judge the constitutionality of federal legislation. In a given case,
arguments grounded in these considerations could conflict with
arguments based on the constitutional text, constitutional structure,
Supreme Court precedent, the original understanding of the
Constitution, American historical tradition, or an evolving national
consensus on constitutional values. Rather, this investigation takes as
a given the values that the Court’s various federalism opinions have
identified as relevant to the practice of constitutional adjudication.
Rather than imposing constitutional values, in other words, this
153. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 95, at 63 (“Why not at least consider the practical effects
on local democratic self-government of decisions interpreting the Constitution’s principles of
federalism—principles that themselves seek to further that very kind of government?”).
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analysis assesses the extent to which anticommandeering doctrine
tends to promote or to impede realization of the Court’s own stated
values. Accordingly, this inquiry bears no burden of establishing the
constitutional moment of the federalism values that it examines.154
That said, a few observations on the status of state regulatory
control as a value of constitutional moment are warranted to further
defend the jurisprudential relevance of this analysis. This inquiry’s
focus on regulatory autonomy is grounded in several sources of
authority in American constitutional law. The Tenth Amendment
speaks of “powers . . . reserved to the States,” which is a way of
referencing the constitutional significance of state retention of
regulatory authority. The text of the Tenth Amendment, moreover,
articulates what other parts of the Constitution and the vertical
constitutional structure presuppose and rely upon–that the federal
government created by the Constitution will execute its
responsibilities against the backdrop of states that generally may use
their police powers to regulate public and private entities.155 Several
key parts of the constitutional text and structure appear to express an
underlying purpose to preserve and encourage state regulatory
participation in the government of the nation.156 Similarly, many
Supreme Court opinions and founding materials underscore the

154. As the vigorous debates between the majority and the dissent in New York and Printz
suggest, arguments sounding in constitutional text, structure, precedent, originalism, and
tradition have not decisively favored one side or the other in the Court’s Tenth Amendment
cases. Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the Justices would underscore
underlying federalism values.
155. For example, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 authorizes Congress “[t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States,” but “reserve[es] to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.” Similarly, Article I, Section 10 lists numerous activities in which states
may not engage, such as “enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” “coin Money,” or
“emit Bills of Credit.” The implication is that the states would possess the authority to do these
things in the absence of the textual prohibition. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 922923 (2006) (“[The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA)] manifests no intent to regulate the
practice of medicine generally. The silence is understandable given the structure and limitations
of federalism . . . . The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning
medical profession regulated under the States’ police powers.”).
156. Cf. BREYER, supra note 95, at 115 (“Throughout, I have urged attention to purpose and
consequences. My discussion sees individual constitutional provisions as embodying certain basic
purposes, often expressed in highly general terms. It sees the Constitution itself as a single
document designed to further certain basic general purposes as a whole. It argues that an
understanding of, and a focus upon, those general purposes will help a judge better to
understand and to apply specific provisions. And it identifies consequences as an important
yardstick to measure a given interpretation’s faithfulness to these democratic purposes.”).
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fundamental importance of state regulatory power to our
constitutional system.157
Finally, although intense disagreements have erupted at
different points in American history over whether particular issues
should be decided by the states or by the federal government (for
example, racial issues), Americans have always almost universally
accepted states as legitimate centers of significant regulatory power
across a broad range of other issues (for example, the family,
education, criminal law enforcement, and local land use in the absence
of environmental harms).158 Accordingly, there is good reason to
believe that the value of state regulatory autonomy is of constitutional
significance and thus that anticommandeering doctrine’s impact on
state autonomy is no mere “policy” concern better directed at
Congress.
B. Why the Litigation?
The next objection seems straightforward: if this inquiry is
correct, the Court fails to advance the interests of the states when it
holds that commandeering violates the Tenth Amendment. But to the
extent anticommandeering doctrine makes the states worse off, they
should be able to figure out these perverse consequences on their own,
and rational states would not press the Court to take the
commandeering power away from the federal government.
This objection, however, overlooks the distinction between the
values of federalism and the political self-interest of state officials at a
particular time. This analysis has been concerned with the former, not
the latter. State officials may have an interest in challenging a
particular instance of commandeering if they do not (or no longer)
want to be bound by a federal regulation. They may have such an
interest regardless of the long-run federalism costs or costs to other
states,159 and despite their own expressed preferences before the

157. See, e.g., supra notes 88, 148 and accompanying text (quoting THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
and various Supreme Court opinions).
158. This last statement refers not only to the constitutional authority of history and
tradition, but also to the authority of the Constitution as ethos – as an evolving instantiation of
American collective identity. See ROBERT C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 23-50 (1995) (arguing that
constitutional interpretation is ineluctably responsive to contemporary conceptions of value).
159. Notably, some states sided with the federal government in Printz and New York. See
Brief of the States of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 923 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), 1996 WL 5950921; Brief of Respondents,
States of Washington, Nevada and South Carolina, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (Nos. 91-543, 91-558, and 90-563), 1992 WL 526133.
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federal regulation went into effect. This, of course, is what happened
in New York.160 The petitioner state internalized more of the benefits
of its successful constitutional challenge than it did the costs. Under
these circumstances, it is no surprise that New York brought suit.
This distinction between the values of federalism and the
political self-interest of state officials at a particular time is critical
and warrants further consideration. The foregoing analysis has
argued that federalism values are compromised when states lose
regulatory control, regardless of whether state officials are eager to
cede regulatory authority to the federal government. The fact that
state officials sometimes seek to relinquish regulatory power161 is
largely beside the point within the context of this inquiry. The
relevant normative question, rather, is what the constitutionally
grounded values of federalism identify as the appropriate level of state
regulatory control. Normatively, as opposed to descriptively, it would
be odd for a federalism that values states as guardians against federal
tyranny to countenance local avoidance of political responsibility as a
benefit indirectly conferred by anticommandeering doctrine through
an increase in preemption.
From a constitutional perspective that values federalism, the
optimal extent and form of federal regulation is ultimately a
normative question of constitutional law, not a descriptive issue that
turns on the political preferences of state officeholders. Constitutional
law and economics, unlike other kinds of economic analysis, cannot
take all preferences as given. Rather, a normative theory of value–
here, one supplied by federalism theory and doctrine–is necessary to
determine which costs and benefits are admissible in a theoretical
analysis of state autonomy.162

160. See supra Parts I and III.
161. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 797 (1995) (“[Federalism] is not always
of value to state and local officials. To begin with, it is sometimes in the interest of state and
local officials for them to pass the buck on the hardest problems of government by deferring to
the folks in Washington, D.C.” (emphasis added)); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 941 (2005) (“[T]here is no logical
relationship between the policy interests of state citizens and the amount of regulation flowing
from the federal government or left to the states. Federal regulation and spending obviously can,
and often does, benefit state-level constituencies. Consequently, state officials who are primarily
interested in maximizing political support will have no reliable interest in decreasing federal
power (or, the equivalent, in increasing state power).” (footnotes omitted)).
162. The preferences of state officials may be relevant, however, regarding questions of
political accountability. See supra Part III (discussing New York).
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C. Isn’t Preemption the Problem, Not Commandeering?
This inquiry focuses on the choice between commandeering and
its alternatives, particularly preemption, from a federalism
perspective. The central claim is that anticommandeering doctrine
does not serve federalism values when the Court’s application of the
rule ultimately results in a greater number of preemptive responses,
because preemption generally causes a greater compromise of
federalism values than does commandeering. Relevant to this
argument is the reality that the Rehnquist Court left preemption wide
open as an alternative to commandeering. But what if that Court had
not, or what if the Roberts Court changes course? One might respond
to this inquiry by suggesting that the Court should strictly limit
preemption in addition to maintaining anticommandeering doctrine in
its current form.
There is some force to this argument, but less than might at
first appear. If preemption is “taken off the table,” so to speak, then so
is much of the foregoing analysis of anticommandeering doctrine. But
it is not clear how the Court could remove preemption as a
constitutional alternative in many instances without radically
transforming the constitutional regime in which we live. For example,
the scope of the commerce power would have to be greatly restricted,
or the Supremacy Clause would have to be fundamentally
reinterpreted, to compel the conclusion that the New York Court erred
in noting that preemption remained available to combat an interstate
nuclear waste problem generated by commercial activity.163
Granted, the Roberts Court could hold state and local laws
preempted less often than the Rehnquist Court did. The Rehnquist
Court’s apparent lack of concern for the impact of broad federal
preemption on state regulatory control in the commandeering context
is hardly sui generis. It is one of the puzzles of that Court’s legacy that
the same Justices who wrote passionately about the virtues of
federalism seemed somewhat tone deaf to the implications of broad
federal preemption for the vindication of a substantive vision of state
autonomy. The five Justices in the majority in critical cases involving
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause164 or

163. See supra text accompanying note 7.
164. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked
authority under either the Commerce Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 creating a private civil remedy for victims
of gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating, for the
first time since the New Deal, a federal statute regulating private conduct—the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990—as beyond the commerce power). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
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Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment165 were often the most
likely to hold state laws preempted.166 Professor Ernest Young has
made this point repeatedly,167 as have other commentators of diverse

(holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to prohibit the local cultivation and use
of marijuana in states allowing such activity).
165. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits employment
discrimination against the disabled, is beyond the scope of Section 5); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is
beyond the scope of Section 5); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress could not lawfully
abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits because the provisions of the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 are beyond the scope of
Section 5); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 is beyond the scope of Section 5). But see United States v. Georgia, 126
S.Ct. 877 (2006) (holding unanimously that insofar as Title II of the ADA creates a private
damages action against states for conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding
that, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,
Title II of the ADA constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power); Nev. Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the family-care leave provision of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 as a valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power to combat
unconstitutional sex discrimination).
166. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462 (2002) (observing that the Rehnquist Court
held in favor of federal preemption in almost two-thirds of the then thirty-five preemption cases
decided since Justice Thomas joined the Court); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial
Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369-70 (studying the Rehnquist Court’s voting alignments in
eight non-unanimous preemption cases decided during the October 1999-2001 Terms; noting that
“Justice Scalia voted to preempt in all eight, the Chief Justice and Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy in seven each, and Justice Thomas in six”; and further observing that “in those same
eight cases, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer each voted to preempt only twice and Justice
Stevens never voted to preempt”).
167. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1377-84 (2001) (observing that the Rehnquist Court’s allegedly state-rights majority often votes
against the states in preemption cases); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the
Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 39-40 (contending that the Court’s preemption
decisions are significantly more important for state autonomy than are the rulings articulating a
robust conception of state sovereign immunity).
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ideological commitments.168 The Justices, however, apparently do not
perceive any tension.169
The suggestion that the Court should hold state law preempted
less frequently, however, implicates questions of statutory
construction, not constitutional law.170 When Congress makes clear its
intent to preempt certain state and local laws, and when such
preemptive action would otherwise fall within the commerce power,
removing preemption as an option would be too bitter a pill to swallow
even for most federalist Justices.171 It would also be difficult to justify
disabling Congress from regulating interstate commercial matters,172
particularly when the states are individually incompetent in light of
collective action problems.173
D. What about Conditional Non-Preemption?
Another objection seizes upon the potentially attenuated
nature of the link between the application of anticommandeering
doctrine in a particular case and future instances of preemption. This

168. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004) (critiquing the Rehnquist Court’s
preemption decisions for broadly interpreting federal law in favor of commercial interests and at
the expense of progressive state regulatory measures); Fallon, supra note 166, at 471-72; Calvin
Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 508 (2002) (“Given the
broad range of issues over which Congress has undoubted power to regulate, the failure of the
Court to apply preemption doctrine sparingly, and with real attention both to Congress’s intent
and the values of federalism, will in the long run prove disastrous to perpetuation of the very
real values underlying the diffusion of power inherent in federalism.”); Meltzer, supra note 166,
at 362-78.
169. But see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 46 (2006) (questioning “the
widespread impression of a sharp discontinuity between the Rehnquist Court’s ‘pro-state’
federalism decisions and its ‘nationalist’ preemption decisions”).
170. See supra note 17.
171. On the other hand, if one accepts the view that the Tenth Amendment imposes
independent limits on congressional power (akin to other parts of the Bill of Rights), then certain
hard-to-specify constitutional limits on preemption would seem to follow, at least when
preemption imposes an extreme burden on the states. See supra notes 25-29, 36, 94 and
accompanying text (discussing National League of Cities and Garcia). See also supra note 105
and accompanying text (discussing the potentially onerous burden that federal preemption
imposes on states).
172. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (“Space in radioactive waste
disposal sites is frequently sold by residents of one State to residents of another. Regulation of
the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress’ authority
under the Commerce Clause. . . . Petitioners likewise do not dispute that under the Supremacy
Clause Congress could, if it wished, preempt state radioactive waste regulation.”).
173. See supra notes 67, 140 and accompanying text (discussing the collective action problem
implicated in New York); see also COOTER, supra note 90, at 103-07 (analyzing public goods and
spillovers).
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criticism argues that if the Court’s holding in New York raises
concerns because of possible preemption going forward, then current
doctrine is exactly right because the Court has banned
commandeering while allowing Congress to offer states a choice
between commandeering and preemption.174 This scheme can be
denoted “conditional non-preemption” because Congress is
conditioning its decision not to preempt state and local laws in a
certain area upon the agreement of the states to be commandeered,
which Congress lacks the power to do directly.175 With conditional
non-preemption, preemption is certain to occur if commandeering does
not.
For example, statutes such as the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)176
avoid the commandeering problem because they give states a choice. If
states want to administer the clean air program in their states, they
can prepare state implementation plans (“SIPs”) that meet federal
minimum criteria. But if they do not, then the Act empowers the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to write a federal
implementation plan (“FIP”) for such states.177 EPA has written
several FIPs over the years, but few have gone into effect because the
states ultimately have preferred to retain control over the
implementation of the national standards.178
174. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (“[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate
private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer States
the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation. This arrangement, which has been termed ‘a program of
cooperative federalism,’ is replicated in numerous federal statutory schemes.” (internal citations
omitted)). For a description of this “cooperative federalism” model, see Adler, supra note 15, at
384-87.
175. Conditional non-preemption is structurally analogous to conditional federal
expenditures under the Spending Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. See supra notes 3, 51 and
accompanying text; supra Part II.D (analyzing the conditional spending power from a federalism
perspective).
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006).
177. For an able discussion of the “federal-state partnership” structure of the CAA, see
Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1406-11 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Adler, supra note 15, at 44748.
178. An interesting facet of the strategic posturing, however, is that EPA may be reluctant to
impose FIPs because of the local anger generated when Washington, D.C. dictates such behavior
as one’s personal driving and cooking habits. A FIP for ozone can govern such matters as local
transportation and barbecue emissions. Personal Communication with Professor Jonathan
Wiener, Duke University School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (January 24, 2006). This dimension of
the problem suggests that the preemption alternative to SIPs is not truly automatic; EPA might
hesitate before imposing a FIP. Yet perhaps a non-governmental organization (“NGO”) could
eventually sue EPA to force it to adopt a FIP. In the longer term, after witnessing the angry
feedback in response to the FIP, Congress might amend the CAA to remove or to dilute the FIP
threat, thereby weakening the incentive of states to adopt SIPs. Thus, one could model this
series of interactions as a multiperiod strategic game among several actors–the states, EPA, the
NGO, and Congress. But this is a game for another day.
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Thus, instead of allowing commandeering because of possible
preemption later on if commandeering were prohibited, the Court has
permitted commandeering only after Congress commits to preemptive
action if the states decline to be commandeered. When the Court bans
commandeering, preemption is merely possible. When the Court
allows conditional non-preemption, preemption is assured if
commandeering does not take place. The challenge for this inquiry is
to explain why, from a federalism perspective, a regime allowing
conditional non-preemption but not commandeering is less preferable
than one that allows both. In any situation in which Congress is
willing to regulate directly if it cannot commandeer because of an
anticommandeering rule, it should also be willing to pass a
conditionally non-preemptive statute. In any other situation, an
anticommandeering rule cannot cause a greater amount of direct
federal regulation going forward.
From a federalism perspective, however, the choice that
conditional non-preemption provides may not be preferable to the lack
of choice that commandeering entails. In order to make a credible
threat of preemption if the states refuse to be commandeered,
Congress often must commit to putting federal “boots on the ground.”
For example, the CAA’s conditional non-preemption provisions are
effective only because EPA is able to step in if states refuse to enforce
federal requirements.179 The existence of a federal administrative
structure changes the federal-state balance in the relevant field for
many of the same reasons that direct federal regulation does: federal
administrators are present and making federal policy to some extent.
And with the federal regime in place, more invasive federal
regulations may be forthcoming.180 Accordingly, it may not be
plausible to hypothesize a situation in which Congress credibly
threatens preemption without imposing at least some direct
regulation or agency oversight of states that has an impact similar to
direct regulation. Commandeering is preferable to this type of
oversight insofar as it affords states more flexibility to make policy
choices.181

179. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
180. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the
name of States’ rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national
bureaucracies to implement its policies.”); supra note 127 and accompanying text.
181. The CAA experience strengthens the point that Printz is actually—and perhaps counter
intuitively—a stronger case than New York from an anticommandeering perspective. See supra
Part III. When the federal government is merely trying to get the states to do the leg work, a rule
against commandeering might advance federalism values. By contrast, when a significant
amount of discretion exists in executing a regulatory action (as there generally is under the
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E. Is the Likelihood of Preemption High?
The next objection is related to, but distinct from, the last one.
This inquiry presents a story of counterintuitive results and perverse
consequences only to the extent that the Court’s commandeering ban
causes Congress to preempt state and local law more often than it
otherwise would, thereby compromising federalism values to a greater
extent than would commandeering. Skeptics might suggest that this
story is possible but improbable because preemption of the kind that
compromises federalism values is unlikely to result when the Court
removes commandeering as a regulatory option. This may be so for at
least two reasons.
First, the distinction between commandeering and preemption
from the standpoint of state autonomy is sometimes not clear-cut
because not all types of preemption have the same impact on
federalism values. It is one thing for Congress to preempt a field or to
set a specific rule with which all regulated actors must comply. It is
another for Congress to set a regulatory floor, above which states can
regulate further if they choose. The latter type of preemption, like
many instances of commandeering, allows states to retain some
measure of regulatory control.182
Second, if Congress would prefer to commandeer but cannot,
then Congress’s second choice might not be preemption. Rather, its
next-best alternative might entail regulating in a way conceptually
and operationally more analogous to commandeering – such as using
the conditional spending power or conditional non-preemption. If this
is right, then anticommandeering doctrine does not significantly
increase the probability of preemption going forward. For example,
commandeering is often attractive when states possess an
administrative capacity or infrastructure that the federal government
lacks. Preemption, however, can be infeasible, at least in the short
run, in regulatory situations involving large, fixed start-up costs.
Moreover, heavy-handed federal preemption can be politically
unpopular locally. It also requires a “boots on the ground” or “nation
building” commitment from the federal government that may be
lacking. The preemption “threat,” in other words, may not be credible.
Members of Congress tend to talk about preempting state and local
law more often than they do it.

CAA), federalism values are often better secured through commandeering than through
preemption.
182. See supra note 17.
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Regarding the first point, it is true that preemption, like
commandeering, can leave states a significant degree of regulatory
control. But it is difficult to see how a given instance of preemption
can offer states more regulatory control than a corresponding use of
commandeering. With preemption, Congress wills not only the end but
also the means. With commandeering, Congress wills just the end. If
only one means is available to achieve the end, then commandeering
and preemption affect state regulatory control to the same extent.
Logically, however, it is not evident how preemption could offer states
more regulatory control. In other words, it might happen that a
particular use of commandeering leaves states with no more choices
than would preemption, such as when both command the same
behavior. But many situations exist when commandeering leaves
states with more choices than would preemption, as in New York,
while it is difficult to identify situations when preemption would allow
states more choices than would commandeering.
Regarding the second point, there were scores of preemption
statutes in the United States Code, many more than there were
instances of commandeering even before 1992, when New York was
decided.183 In addition, preemption is not typically unpopular, nor is
the federal will to preempt a rare political phenomenon.184 While the
absence of a federal regulatory infrastructure may sometimes deter
immediate preemptive action, this will not always be the case, and a
commandeering ban gives Congress a greater incentive to put “boots
on the ground” by building such an infrastructure.185 Moreover, states
may not always agree to the conditions attached to federal funds, and
conditional non-preemption also requires Congress to express the will
to preempt. Finally, none of the above counterarguments suggest—let
alone compel—the conclusion that the likelihood of preemption will
usually be so trivial if Congress cannot commandeer that the Court
has been justified in ignoring the question of state regulatory control.
It is ultimately a context-sensitive empirical question whether
applying the commandeering ban in a particular setting would cause
the federal government to respond by engaging in preemption, using
183. Rather than 1992, the relevant time period may be the 1970s, when several (though not
all) federal courts of appeals rejected commandeering imposed by EPA, and the federal
government stopped the practice before the Supreme Court could decide the constitutional
question. See Adler, supra note 15, at 423-24.
184. For example, after the Ninth Circuit invalidated the commandeering statute at issue in
Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, see supra note 62, Congress responded with preemption.
See Adler, supra note 15, at 425 (“Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Congress amended the
[law] to require the Secretary of Commerce to issue federal regulations directly limiting the
export of unprocessed logs.”).
185. See supra notes 127, 180 and accompanying text.
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the conditional spending power or conditional non-preemption, or
simply giving up and issuing no federal regulation. Sometimes
preemption will be more likely, and sometimes it will be less likely for
a variety of legal and political reasons.
There are various ways one could try to investigate this issue
both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, one could examine the
universe of commandeering statutes and ask whether a preemption
alternative would have been feasible, and if so, whether preemption
would have been more effective than other regulatory approaches in
light of the congressional priorities articulated in the statute and the
legislative history. One could do the same for the much larger
universe of preemption statutes in the United States Code—that is,
ask whether there were feasible and comparatively effective
commandeering alternatives available to Congress. Such an inquiry
would require many contestable judgment calls regarding issues of
feasibility and efficacy.
Theoretically, one could inquire why Congress would ever want
to commandeer. The answer to this question has important
implications for the regulatory outcome that is most likely to occur if
Congress cannot commandeer. To be sure, sometimes Congress will
commandeer because only the states have the necessary people on the
ground to carry out the federal mandate. At other times, however, the
federal government commandeers instead of preempting because the
states prefer commandeering and they impact the federal legislative
process. At still other times, Congress may get “lazy” and choose one
regulatory approach without thinking through the alternatives.
Ultimately, however, this debate over the likelihood of
preemption when commandeering is prohibited misses the intended
contribution of this inquiry, which is primarily to advance a
conceptual claim, not an empirical one. Because there often will exist
a non-trivial chance that Congress will engage in preemption when it
cannot commandeer, and because it is impossible for the Court to
know at the time of judicial decision where a given case fits along the
continuum of preemption probabilities, federalism doctrine requires a
strategically sophisticated conceptual system, one that accounts for all
of the regulatory possibilities before Congress. The basic error the
Court has made, in other words, is that it has examined the
accountability effects of commandeering without comparing
commandeering to its alternatives and their effects on federalism
values, which include but transcend accountability. If the Court made
such a comparison, it would not insist upon a federalism doctrine in
which commandeering is categorically barred, federal statutes are
routinely construed to have broad preemptive effect, and Congress can
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condition federal funding on state agreements to be commandeered
even when the amount of money involved leaves the states no
reasonable choice.
Indeed, the “preemption is unlikely” objection to this critique of
anticommandeering doctrine implicitly (if unwittingly) acknowledges
that the Court’s defense of its doctrine is inadequate. The most
persuasive argument in favor of New York and Printz is not that
accountability concerns trump all other considerations.186 Rather, the
argument is that commandeering raises serious accountability
problems and imposes potentially significant financial costs on the
states, and that a commandeering ban does not generate considerable,
countervailing concerns about state retention of regulatory control
(and accountability as well). For the reasons stated, this inquiry
disagrees with this view. But the most important point is that the
debate should center on a more complicated constitutional calculus
than the accountability story told by the Court.
F. Why Shouldn’t Accountability Trump?
Those who find the Court’s accountability concerns
compelling—perhaps even a constitutional “trump”—may be inclined
to dismiss the foregoing analysis on the ground that accountability
values are sufficient by themselves to render commandeering
unconstitutional. This conclusion would be shortsighted for at least
two reasons.
First, as discussed in the Introduction and extensively by other
commentators,187 it is not clear that political accountability is a
constitutional value that the Justices are supposed to police in the
service of federalism. The Tenth Amendment does not so instruct.188
Nor is it apparent generally that commandeering generates
insurmountable accountability concerns, or that preemption,
conditional non-preemption, and conditional federal spending avoid
similar accountability problems.189
Second, no one value should be regarded as absolute in an area
of constitutional law implicating inherent value pluralism. If a
186. Even when federalism values are reduced to accountability concerns, a ban on
commandeering may be self-undermining. To the extent that anticommandeering doctrine
results in greater use of the conditional spending power, for example, the doctrine generates
potentially serious accountability problems. Unlike commandeering or preemption, conditional
spending statues can present state voters with the false impression of a free choice to regulate in
exchange for federal dollars. See supra note 14; Part II.D.
187. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 12-15, 186 and accompanying text.

1682

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:5:1629

particular federalism doctrine makes states worse off in terms of
regulatory power forgone, the question arises whether the game is
worth the candle. Federalists, in other words, have an interest in
considering whether the accountability benefits alleged to be
generated by current Tenth Amendment doctrine are cost-justified by
exceeding the expected damage to state regulatory control caused by
preemption. Federalists should also consider the relative financial
costs imposed on the states by commandeering and its alternatives.
The answer to this cost-benefit question is ultimately contextsensitive, largely empirical, relatively unexamined, and therefore
uncertain. Still, it is the most relevant inquiry to make if one is
committed to more than a judicially administrable but largely
symbolic gesture in the direction of federalism.190 That is, the costbenefit issue is the question to pose if one wants to determine the
value of anticommandeering doctrine to the project of constitutional
federalism.191 And lest this objection to the doctrine be deemed
uncharitable or overstated, recall Justice Scalia’s chilling rigidity on
190. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 14, at 1007 (“[New York] is symbolism, nothing more; a
line drawn in the sand for the sake of drawing a line.”); id. at 1088-89 (“The Court’s anticommandeering rule [is] best understood as a symbolic gesture—waving the banner of state
sovereignty whether victory was here deserved or not.”); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 200 (noting that “while
[Printz] represents a decisive symbolic victory for state sovereignty, some would characterize its
immediate practical impact as relatively minor”). Anticommandeering doctrine is relatively
broad and deep, but its real-world effects have been quite modest in part because the federal
government engaged in little commandeering even before 1992. See supra note 103; see also
Caminker, supra, at 200, n.6 (noting that “there are only a handful of other recent
commandeering statutes that clearly fall within the [Printz] decision’s ambit”); id. at 243
(concluding that “Printz does not appear to curtail prior nationalist assertions of power in a
significant manner”).
Regarding Printz in particular, the Brady Act’s interim provisions for background checks on
firearm purchasers were scheduled to be replaced by a federal computer database as soon as it
was ready to go online. The database is operational. See Federal Bureau of Investigation,
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”), http://foia.fbi.gov/nics552g.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (“The purpose of NICS, which was established pursuant to the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act), is to provide a means of checking available
information to determine whether a person is disqualified from possessing a firearm under
federal or state law.”).
The present, however, is not necessarily prelude to the future. The Roberts Court could use
anticommandeering doctrine to invalidate other federal laws or executive actions, including
those imposing reporting requirements that do not now clearly fall within the scope of the ban.
See Caminker, supra note 190, at 200 n.6 (collecting various federal laws that require state
officials to gather and report information to federal authorities). The Printz Court stated that it
was not deciding whether reporting requirements fall within the ban on commandeering. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923, 917-18 (1997); see also id. at 936 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). In a post-9/11 world, moreover, it is uncertain what the future may bring in the
realm of commandeering. See infra Part V.
191. Cf. Caminker, supra note 14, at 1007 (calling for the Court to “engage in a more serious
and sophisticated inquiry into the role that federalism values ought to play in our polity today”).
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behalf of the Court in Printz: “It is the very principle of separate state
sovereignty that [commandeering] offends, and no comparative
assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental
defect.”192 While it is black letter law that the Constitution allows
facial distinctions on the basis of race if the state interest is
sufficiently weighty,193 the Rehnquist Court allowed no such balancing
in the context of commandeering. Accountability concerns do not
justify the Court’s categorical rule.
G. Why Not Prefer Rules over Standards?
One might agree with the theoretical suggestion that the
values animating anticommandeering doctrine need not have uniform
bite in all contexts, yet nonetheless conclude as a practical matter that
the Court’s categorical rule is sound. On this view, much of the
difference between this inquiry’s balancing argument and the holding
in New York concerns the distinction between a rule and a standard.
In the particular circumstances of New York, perhaps federalism
values would have been better served by allowing commandeering, yet
this suggestion just assumes the conclusion that the question should
be settled by a legal standard requiring case-by-case application. The
choice between bright-line rules and flexible standards implicates a
famously complicated jurisprudential and ideological controversy, one
that is closely related to the debate in constitutional law between
categorization and balancing.194 In the commandeering context, the
clarity of rules may be especially protective of federalism values when,
in contrast to Europe, states tend to be less involved in the
formulation of the federal law that would commandeer.195
Putting aside the questionable assumption that greater state
involvement in the formulation of federal policy means greater
192. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932. See id. at 935 (“[N]o case-by-case weighing of the burdens or
benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty.”). See also Young, supra note 72, at 127 (“The anticommandeering
doctrine is . . . . the hardest of rules, apparently recognizing no exceptions for even the clearest of
statements or the weightiest of federal interests.”); Caminker, supra note 190, at 200 (“The Court
[in Printz] announced a categorical anti-commandeering rule, one not subject to any case-by-case
balancing of interests or measurement of burden.”).
193. For the Court’s most recent pronouncement, see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499,
505 (2005).
194. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1991). Cf. Neil
S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1645, 1663-66 (2005)
(discussing the rules-versus-standards debate in the context of wartime threats to civil liberties).
195. See supra Part II.E.
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protection of federalism values,196 the problem with this defense of
anticommandeering doctrine is that the Court’s rule is so over- and
under- inclusive with respect to the purpose of safeguarding
federalism values as to be vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness.
The anticommandeering ban is over-inclusive because one can readily
imagine instances of commandeering that advance, rather than
thwart, federalism values—for example, the facts of New York. At the
same time, the rule is under-inclusive because it does not account for
other regulatory alternatives, particularly preemption, that can
impose truly awful consequences by stripping states of regulatory
control and generating a complex picture of accountability.
Conditional federal spending, moreover, can offer states no reasonable
choice, raising both accountability and regulatory-control concerns.197
One can persuasively argue for a rule over a standard in certain
situations, but one cannot plausibly suggest that any rule will do.
More aggressive use of preemption after New York would illustrate
the general phenomenon that rules, which lack the chilling effect
imposed by standards, may free strategic actors to pursue counterpurposive advantage right up to the line demarcated by the rule.198
Indeed, the Court’s constitutionally decisive classification of a
federal regulation as commandeering, preemption, conditional nonpreemption, or conditional spending is normatively empty. In general,
federal laws falling into any of these categories can safeguard or
undermine federalism values. Sound legal doctrine requires a
functional analysis of a federal law’s impact on constitutionally
relevant federalism values, not a bright-line distinction that judges all
instances of commandeering out of bounds but interprets invasive
federal regulations to have broad preemptive effect.
V. COMMANDEERING AFTER 9/11
An illustration other than New York and Printz is useful to
show how the analysis defended in this inquiry is preferable to the
Court’s categorical approach to commandeering. The example, briefly
referenced in the Introduction, will also serve to illuminate how the
Court should handle the relevant issues going forward.
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 generally prohibits U.S.
military personnel from directly participating in law enforcement
activities within the United States—for example, interdictions,
196. See supra Part IV.B.
197. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
198. See KELMAN, supra note 194, at 41; Kennedy, supra note 194, at 1773–74; Sullivan,
supra note 194, at 63.
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surveillance, searches, seizures, and arrests on behalf of civilian law
enforcement authorities—except when expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Congress.199 Congress has provided for several
exceptions to the Act.200
Presumably, Congress could amend the Posse Comitatus Act to
specify that under defined conditions in the wake of a terrorist attack,
the United States military would have exclusive authority to maintain
law and order within the affected area.201 There might need to be
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”). The original 1878 Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA” or
“Act”) referred only to the United States Army. The Air Force was added in 1956. The Act’s
prohibitions were extended to all the services with the enactment of 10 U.S.C. § 375, which
directed the Secretary of Defense to
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including
the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any
personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a
member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or
other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is
otherwise authorized by law.
10 U.S.C. § 375 (2006). The Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense Directive 5525.5.
See
United
States
Northern
Command
Fact
Sheet,
Posse
Comitatus
Act,
http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.factsheets&factsheet=5 (last visited Dec.
25, 2005). For background and analysis, see generally Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse
Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding
Before Any More Damage is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86 (2003); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the
Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383
(2003); Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatuts Act: A Principle in Need of
Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 953 (1997).
200. These include statutes that: (1) authorize U.S. military personnel to provide
counterdrug assistance, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-381 (2006); (2) allow the President to use U.S. military
personnel at the request of a state legislature or governor to suppress insurrections, 10 U.S.C. §§
331-335 (2006); (3) permit Department of Defense personnel to assist the Department of Justice
in enforcing prohibitions regarding nuclear materials, when the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation” exists posing a serious
threat to U.S. interests beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies, 18 U.S.C. §
831 (2006); and (4) allow Department of Defense personnel to assist the Department of Justice in
enforcing prohibitions regarding biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction, when the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation”
exists posing a serious threat to U.S. interests beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement
agencies, 10 U.S.C. § 382 (2006).
201. The President arguably possesses inherent Article II authority to use the military in
such situations, as long as he acts in the absence of a congressional prohibition. Cf. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President has independent
power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers.”); Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 53 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 42, 43
(Feb. 9, 2006) (“To say that the President has inherent authority does not mean that his
authority is exclusive, or that his conduct is not subject to statutory regulations enacted . . .
pursuant to Congress’s Article I powers.”). Even when Congress has not acted, there are limits to
the President’s inherent authority. As held in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the
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other limits (time, for example) to make the law clearly constitutional,
but that is just fine tuning. So, what if Congress decides not to replace
state and local law enforcement personnel with the military, but
instead chooses to put state and local officers under federal command
(with federal pay) for the duration of the emergency conditions?
If New York and Printz mean what they say, Congress would
be prohibited from placing state and local officers under federal
control; the authorizing legislation would fall within the Court’s
prohibition of commandeering.202 Under current Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence, however, and putting aside other constitutional
considerations and the wisdom of the choice, there would be no
constitutional impediment to Congress’ authorizing the military to
maintain law and order within the area targeted by the terrorist
attack until the emergency had passed.203

President may not substitute military courts for civilian courts in geographic areas of the country
where civilian courts are functioning, unless Congress suspends the writ of habeas corpus.
202. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 190, at 243 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923,
940 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Stevens is surely correct to observe that a
commandeering power might still be extremely important to protect national interests in an
emergency.”). Justice Stevens authored these “prescient” words, Althouse, supra note 76, at
1233, more than four years before September 11, 2001:
Indeed, since the ultimate issue is one of power, we must consider its implications in
times of national emergency. Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the
administration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall an
epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national
response before federal personnel can be made available to respond. If the
Constitution empowers Congress and the President to make an appropriate response,
is there anything in the Tenth Amendment, “in historical understanding and practice,
in the structure of the Constitution, [or] in the jurisprudence of this Court,” ante, at
2370, that forbids the enlistment of state officers to make that response effective?
More narrowly, what basis is there in any of those sources for concluding that it is the
Members of this Court, rather than the elected representatives of the people, who
should determine whether the Constitution contains the unwritten rule that the
Court announces today?
Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Althouse, supra note 76, at 1235, 1266-68
(asking whether the needs of the federal government in fighting terrorism may cause the Court
to articulate a national-security exception to anticommandeering doctrine, but arguing that the
“doctrine should be preserved in its absolute form not only in spite of the war on terrorism, but
precisely because it can protect individual rights that the exigencies of war may lead courts to
narrowly construe”).
203. Congress’s power to enact legislation dealing with external threats to national security
finds several textual justifications in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which contains a
number of military-related powers. They include the spending power in clause 1, which expressly
refers to “the common Defence,” and the necessary and proper power in clause 18, which grants
Congress the authority to carry into effect the President’s powers in this area as well. That said,
the Constitution’s independent limits apply generally to these congressional powers, although
not necessarily in the same way. Accordingly, if National League of Cities were revived, see supra
notes 24-29, 36, 94 and accompanying text, its holding might create problems for a preemption
statute of the sort hypothesized in the text.
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It is questionable whether this constitutional delineation of
Congress’s freedom of action is sound from a federalism perspective.
According to the Rehnquist Court, criminal law enforcement is a
traditional subject of state concern,204 an area regarding which our
federal system historically has preserved a significant degree of state
regulatory control. Yet the impermissible commandeering option is the
one that leaves room for state regulatory control if Congress allows
deputized state officers to exercise discretion (which they inevitably
would have to exercise in any event). By contrast, the permissible
preemptive alternative allows no room for a state role in maintaining
law and order.205 Moreover, financial considerations do not weigh
against the commandeering option because the legislation specifies
that the mandate would be funded entirely by the federal
government.206 Finally, accountability concerns may be real when
state officers act under federal command yet also exercise discretion,
but a priori they do not seem sufficient to justify what would
otherwise be a perverse situation from a federalism perspective. If
anything can capture the attention of most Americans and impress
upon them who is ultimately in charge, it is a national tragedy like the
attacks of September 11, 2001. Moreover, government at every level
and the news media could clarify to citizens on the ground when state
and local law enforcement personnel were acting in a federal
capacity.207
One could construct other examples to make the same point.
Various federal responses to a natural disaster come to mind,

204. See supra note 164 (discussing Lopez and Morrison). The Morrison Court stated that
“the suppression of [violent crime] has always been the prime object of the States’ police power.”
529 U.S. at 615. The Lopez Court stressed that “[u]nder the theories that the Government
presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in
areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been
sovereign.” 514 U.S. at 564.
205. Cf. BREYER, supra note 95, at 60 (referencing Justice Stevens’ Printz dissent and asking
rhetorically whether the “freedom to enlist state officials [would] not help to advance both the
cause of national security and the cause of cooperative federalism”).
206. The commandeering might trigger some opportunity-cost concerns, however, if state
and local law enforcement priorities were sacrificed during the time when the federal law placed
the state and local officers under federal command. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
207. This commandeering analysis is likely not affected by the constitutional provisions
allowing Congress to call forth and govern the state militias, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16. By
firmly established historical understanding and legal practice, state and local law enforcement
personnel are not included within the militia. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison). Nor would Article IV,
Section 4 appear to affect the constitutional inquiry. It provides that the United States “shall
protect each [State] against Invasion.” This mandate would not allow otherwise prohibited
commandeering when the federal government can use the United States Armed Forces to protect
the states from invasion and thus need not commandeer local law enforcement officers.
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particularly in light of the inadequate federal, state, and local
reactions to Hurricane Katrina.208 If constitutional doctrine is
supposed to vindicate federalism values in reality and not just
symbolically, then the Court should train its attention not only on
political accountability, but also on state retention of regulatory
control and the financial impact of different regulatory regimes on
state budgets. A federalism jurisprudence that does so will deem the
Rehnquist Court’s categorical ban on commandeering seriously over
and under inclusive with respect to the values of federalism. By
reformulating the doctrine along the lines of an ex ante standard
enforced through case-by-case balancing, the Court would be well
positioned to conduct a functional analysis of different instances of
commandeering, paying particular attention to the feasibility of
preemption in various future situations were commandeering
prohibited.
To reiterate, legal standards and balancing tests carry their
own jurisprudential risks. They can be difficult to administer, and
they can confer too much discretion upon lower courts and the Justices
themselves in future cases. But as the foregoing analysis implicitly
suggests, some relatively clear and administrable guidelines are
available, even in the abstract. Instances of commandeering should
carry a presumption of unconstitutionality when preemption is not a
feasible alternative in the short run,209 the federal mandate is
unfunded and expensive, and the federal government makes little
effective effort to alleviate reasonable accountability concerns. Only a
substantial governmental interest should be sufficient to overcome
this presumption.210 By contrast, commandeering should be held
constitutional as far as the Tenth Amendment is concerned when
preemption is a feasible alternative in the short run and such
208. See, e.g., Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1 (“Federal Emergency Management Agency officials expected the
state and city to direct their own efforts and ask for help as needed. Leaders in Louisiana and
New Orleans, though, were so overwhelmed by the scale of the storm that they were not only
unable to manage the crisis, but they were not always exactly sure what they needed. While local
officials assumed that Washington would provide rapid and considerable aid, federal officials,
weighing legalities and logistics, proceeded at a deliberate pace.”).
209. Courts would have to make a judgment about how likely federal preemption is over
what realistic period of time. Sometimes Congress would have an opportunity to preempt
relatively quickly. Other times Congress would need a new federal regulatory infrastructure that
would require a significant amount of time to establish. The longer it would take for Congress to
act, the more speculative the action would become.
210. This article has examined the issue of commandeering from the standpoint of values
commonly thought to be advanced by federalism. An optimal commandeering doctrine must also
take into account the interests of the federal government. This part of the doctrinal test would
require courts to assess the strength of the national interest in commandeering.
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preemption would reduce state regulatory control relative to the
commandeering at issue, the federal mandate is fully funded or
inexpensive to carry out, and the federal government takes effective
measures to maintain lines of accountability (or accountability is for
some other reason not seriously threatened). More difficult situations
arise when the above factors cut in opposite directions. The Court
would need to address them through the inductive common law
method that characterizes the practice of constitutional
adjudication.211 If the Court were to adopt this approach, Congress
would be well-advised to legislate with the above considerations in
mind so as to avoid confronting the Court with hard commandeering
cases.
According to the above criteria, New York was decided
incorrectly on balance. Although the federal mandate was expensive
for the states to carry out, preemption was a plausible alternative that
also would have imposed significant costs on states,212 and
accountability was not seriously threatened because the states should
have been held accountable for the commandeering sanction they
approved. Therefore, the Court should have permitted commandeering
in New York. Printz, by contrast, is a closer case and is more
defensible than New York from a federalism perspective. On the one
hand, the federal mandate was inexpensive and local law enforcement
officers could have explained to would-be firearms purchasers that
federal law mandated background checks. On the other hand, the
federal government made little effort to alleviate accountability
concerns in enacting the law, and preemption was not a plausible
alternative in the short run. In terms of the likely impact on
federalism
values,
therefore,
the
Court’s
prohibition
of
commandeering in Printz was less problematic than it was in New
York.
One might reiterate the objection that courts are not
institutionally competent to implement such a multi-factored analysis,
and that one benefit of the current doctrine is that it is clear, simple
for courts to apply, and easy for the federal government to work
around in developing federal policies. This criticism, however, proves
too much. Flat prohibitions are the extraordinary exception in
constitutional law, even though they are clearer, simpler, and easier to
work with than rules or standards that tolerate exceptions and
sensitivity to value conflict. The Tenth Amendment inquiry

211. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877 (1996).
212. See supra text following note 144.
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recommended above seems less institutionally demanding and openended than many modes of analysis that govern distinct areas of
constitutional doctrine, including federalism.213
CONCLUSION
Anticommandeering doctrine is seriously over- and underinclusive, whether considered in light of federalism values as a whole,
or in light of the accountability concerns on which the Court has
inappropriately fixated. As has been mentioned in passing throughout
this inquiry,214 such a disconnect between legal doctrine and
animating values suggests that the Rehnquist Court’s Tenth
Amendment legacy has more to do with judicially manageable
symbolism than with the substance of federalism.215
The legal universe is in flux, however, and the Rehnquist Court
is no more. The Roberts Court will decide over the coming years and
decades whether the Constitution is concerned primarily with the
symbolism of federalism or with its substance.216 The answer to this
question will determine, among other things, whether the Court will
insist on applying anticommandeering doctrine of New York and
Printz no matter what—that is, even when there exists a serious
213. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987) (conditional Spending Clause); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (procedural due
process).
214. See supra notes 19, 143, 190 and accompanying text.
215. The triumph of symbolism over substance is also evidenced by the Court’s apparent lack
of concern to limit or overrule Garcia and to rehabilitate National League of Cities. See supra
Part I (discussing National League of Cities and Garcia). This triumph is further illustrated by
the Court’s invigoration of state sovereign immunity in the name of state sovereign “dignity.” See
supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (citing the recent state sovereign immunity
decisions). See also Adler, supra note 15, at 397 (“[T]he Court has invalidated federal actions
that impede upon, or affront the ‘dignity’ of, states qua states. In particular, the Court has held
that the federal government may neither command states to participate in or implement a
federal regulatory program . . . .”); Elizabeth Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 1503, 1559 (2000) (suggesting that
New York and Printz may be animated by concern that commandeering expresses disrespect for
states).
216. The point is not that symbolism should not matter in law. See Paul J. Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 56, 62 (1965) (arguing that “symbols constitute an important element in any societal
structure”); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007). The point, rather, is that a symbol should not routinely be wielded in a way
that misapprehends the substance it is supposed to symbolize. This is what happens when states
retain their “sovereign dignity” at the expense of their regulatory autonomy, even when
accountability values are not significantly compromised and financial burdens are minimal.
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threat to national security or other critical national interests are at
stake; when Congress is determined to regulate one way or another;
when our federal system has an abiding interest in maintaining state
regulatory control; when there exists no reasonable possibility of voter
confusion implicating accountability concerns; and when the financial
costs to the states involved are trivial. If the Roberts Court applies
anticommandeering doctrine even in these circumstances—which the
Rehnquist Court insisted is the Constitution’s command—then
defenders of state autonomy should join advocates of national power in
dissent and emphatically reject the flattery.

